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The Universe UnravelingAmerican Foreign Policy in Cold War Laos$
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Seth Jacobs

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780801445477

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9780801445477.001.0001

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Epilogue

Epilogue

Chapter:
(p.271) Epilogue
Source:
The Universe Unraveling
Author(s):

Seth Jacobs

Publisher:
Cornell University Press
DOI:10.7591/cornell/9780801445477.003.0008

This epilogue argues that Washington’s difficulties in Laos were due to the Lao—not to the problems of distance and terrain, and certainly not to flaws at the core of U.S. foreign policy. The United States had failed to bar communism’s progress in Laos because the natives could not be “de-Laoed.” They were “impossible to motivate,” their “greatest handicap” being “a mentality of passive resistance to change.” Indeed, they were resigned to their fate—a gentle people, lacking discipline, who did not see themselves as initiating activity. Moreover, they admired Westerners but “knew they were incapable of doing what the Westerners did, and so they didn’t bother trying.” This made them poor instruments of U.S. policy.

Keywords:   Laos, Lao, U.S. foreign policy, communism

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