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Creating KosovoInternational Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions$
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Elton Skendaj

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780801452949

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9780801452949.001.0001

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Deadly Cocktail

Deadly Cocktail

Chapter:
(p.61) Chapter 3 Deadly Cocktail
Source:
Creating Kosovo
Author(s):

Elton Skendaj

Publisher:
Cornell University Press
DOI:10.7591/cornell/9780801452949.003.0003

This chapter focuses on two ineffective state bureaucracies in Kosovo: the central administration and the judicial system. These bureaucracies failed to penalize considerable corruption in their ranks, and they were not responsive to the public. Instead of slowly transferring power from the international administrators to the local professionals, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) started by giving power and local ownership to the local judges and prosecutors who had not been recruited based on merit. However, when UNMIK introduced international judges and prosecutors, it reversed the process by taking some of that power back to the international administration. Thus, international jurists ended up substituting for the capacity of the local judges and prosecutors, instead of building it.

Keywords:   Kosovo, central administration, judicial system, international administrators, UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, corruption, power

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