Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Unclear PhysicsWhy Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9781501702785

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501702785.001.0001

Show Summary Details

Saddam’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1981–1987

Saddam’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1981–1987

Chapter:
(p.71) Chapter 3 Saddam’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1981–1987
Source:
Unclear Physics
Author(s):

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer

Publisher:
Cornell University Press
DOI:10.7591/cornell/9781501702785.003.0004

This chapter studies the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, which was implemented after the strike on Osirak on June 7, 1981. In the wake of the strike, Saddam Hussein requested Jafar Dhiya Jafar to create the capacity for clandestine, large-scale production of fissile material. This project was planned and executed under Jafar's leadership, with minimal involvement from Saddam. A group of scientists, with Jafar at the helm, was given unprecedented autonomy in managing the program. Over the next few years, they encountered difficulties and mounting delays, leading to a crisis in 1987 when Jafar and his colleagues realized that the program was failing to meet its objectives.

Keywords:   Jafar Dhiya Jafar, Osirak, Saddam Hussein, nuclear weapons program, Iraq, fissile material

Cornell Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.