Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Unclear PhysicsWhy Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9781501702785

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501702785.001.0001

Show Summary Details

Crises and a Crash Program, 1988–1991

Crises and a Crash Program, 1988–1991

(p.103) Chapter 4 Crises and a Crash Program, 1988–1991
Unclear Physics

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer

Cornell University Press

This chapter narrates how tensions came to a head when the leaders of the nuclear weapons program accused the military–industrial complex of delaying their progress. After Jafar Dhiya Jafar and Humam Abdul Khaliq clashed with Hussein Kamil, Saddam Hussein's powerful son-in-law (and minister of military industries), Kamil took charge of the program. The program was split into two tracks, focusing on different enrichment technologies. Each was subject to more scrutiny and pressure to deliver. As the war with Iran came to an end in the fall of 1988, both tracks were making progress toward large-scale production of fissile material. Meanwhile, a dedicated group was developing a weapons design.

Keywords:   Jafar Dhiya Jafar, Humam Abdul Khaliq, Saddam Hussein, Hussein Kamil, Iran, nuclear weapons program

Cornell Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.