This concluding chapter asserts that the study has portrayed Iraq's and Libya's nuclear programs from an insideout perspective, drawing on the con temporary perspectives of scientists, technical experts, and primary sources that open up these establishments to an unprecedented degree. Where relevant, it has included perspectives from regime officials and the states' leaders on these programs and their purpose. The study also argues that many of the key assumptions about how science “worked” in these regimes were misguided. Seen from this vantage point, the political leadership appears more distant from the weapons programs and, oftentimes, disinterested.
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