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This study seeks to bring international histories of human rights into closer dialogue with military histories of insurgent movements and counterinsurgency warfare. Both military historians and historians of human rights have largely ignored the role of rights activists in shaping wartime policies and practices. This book examines the effects of human rights activism during British counterinsurgency campaigns in Cyprus (1955-1959), Aden (1963-1967), and Northern Ireland (emphasizing 1969-1976). The book argues that in response to human rights activism, British officials developed new ways of covering up their abuses by denying allegations, deflecting criticism, and evading attempts to enforce accountability. Consequently, activists’ efforts and government responses to them linked the metaphorical battlefield of law, diplomacy, propaganda, and public opinion with the physical battlefield of ambushes, house searches, arrests, and interrogations. Focusing the analytical lens on activists and the officials with whom they interacted places human rights activists on the counterinsurgency “battlefield”—not as traditional arms-bearing combatants, but as actors who nonetheless influenced counterinsurgency policies and practices.

This book develops a novel theory to explain how wartime militaries learn. It focuses on the Western Front, which witnessed three great-power armies struggle to cope with deadlock throughout the First World War, as the British, French, and German armies all pursued the same solutions-assault tactics, combined-arms, and elastic defense in depth. By the end of the war, only the German army managed to develop and implement a set of revolutionary offensive, defensive, and combined-arms doctrines that in hindsight represented the best way to fight. The book identifies three organizational variables that determine how fighting militaries generate new ideas, distinguish good ones from bad ones, and implement the best of them across the entire organization. These factors are: the degree to which leadership delegates authority on the battlefield; how effectively the organization retains control over soldier and officer training; and whether or not the military possesses an independent doctrinal assessment mechanism. Through careful study of the British, French, and German experiences in the First World War, the book provides a model that shows how a resolute focus on analysis, command, and training can help prepare modern militaries for adapting amidst high-intensity warfare in an age of revolutionary technological change.

This book examines the use of wedge strategies, a form of divisive statecraft designed to isolate adversaries from allies and potential supporters to gain key advantages. With a multidimensional argument about the power of accommodation in competition, and a survey of alliance diplomacy around both world wars, the book artfully analyzes the past and future performance of wedge strategy in great power politics. It argues that nations attempting to use wedge strategy do best when they credibly accommodate likely or established allies of their enemies. It also argues that a divider's own alliances can pose obstacles to success and explains the conditions that help dividers overcome them. The book advances these claims in eight focused studies of alliance diplomacy surrounding the world wars. Through those narratives, the book adeptly assesses the record of countries that tried an accommodative wedge strategy, and why ultimately, they succeeded or failed. These calculated actions often became turning points, desired or not, in a nation's established power. For policymakers today facing threats to power from great power competitors, the book argues that a deeper historical and theoretical grasp of the role of these wedge strategies in alliance politics and grand strategy is necessary. The book drives home the contemporary relevance of the analysis with a survey of China's potential to use such strategies to divide India from the United States, and the United States' potential to use them to forestall a China–Russia alliance, and closes with a review of key theoretical insights for policy.

This book offers a comprehensive strategic theory for how secessionist movements attempt to win independence. Combining original data analysis, fieldwork, interviews with secessionist leaders, and case studies on Catalonia, the Murrawarri Republic, West Papua, Bougainville, New Caledonia, and Northern Cyprus, the book shows how the rules and informal practices of sovereign recognition create a strategic playing field between existing states and aspiring nations that the book terms “the sovereignty game.” To win sovereign statehood, all secessionist movements have to maneuver on the same strategic playing field while varying their tactics according to local conditions. To obtain recognition, secessionist movements use tactics of electoral capture, nonviolent civil resistance, and violence. To persuade the home state and the international community, they appeal to normative arguments regarding earned sovereignty, decolonization, the right to choose, inherent sovereignty, and human rights. The pursuit of independence can be enormously disruptive and is quite often violent. By advancing a theory that explains how sovereign recognition has succeeded in the past and is working in the present, and by anticipating the practices of future secessionist movements, the book also prescribes solutions that could make the sovereignty game less conflictual.