This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, which is to present a theory of international norm development that explores how states in the developing world respond to the preferences of powerful states. Regardless of where these preferences originate, the overarching implication of this theory is that leaders respond to the changing preferences of more powerful actors within the international system. A corollary to this theory is that it is not necessary for powerful states to impose their will on less-powerful actors for new international norms, rules, and institutions to be generated. Rather these rules and norms can result from diffusely motivated reaction to anticipated international benefits. The present study covers the global development of international election observation from 1960 through 2006. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
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