Exclusionary Institutional Preference
Exclusionary Institutional Preference
The Logic of Jihad
This chapter examines the incentives that can lead individuals to sacrifice their lives for a collective end. It examines the motives and strategies of jihadists, illustrating the incentives that make individuals so constrain their choices under one institution that they crowd out all other possible affiliations. It first considers empirical evidence to test existing claims regarding the link between madrasa affiliation and jihad. After establishing that jihadists are drawn from across the socioeconomic spectrum (with madrasa students constituting a small fraction of the total pool) it examines the motives and decision-making processes of this diverse group. The chapter also explores the factors that win jihad mass public appeal. These questions are addressed through three main sources of data: interviews with fifty jihadists; ethnographic fieldwork within the Red Mosque during its six-month confrontation with the state; and systematic observation of the public response to the Red Mosque operation.
Keywords: sacrifice, jihad, jihadists, madrasas, Islamic schools, Islam, Muslims, Red Mosque
Cornell Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
