This chapter focuses on representational meaning and on what can be said about it based on the relevant philosophical facts established with regard to representational truth and reference. It argues that if we wish to understand representation, meaning has to be our undefined primary term. Next, representational meaning must be situated at the point of intersection of representation and description since we now know how to move from representation to representationalist truth and reference and their Fregean counterparts. But this is a route that can be followed in one direction only; it is impossible to derive representational meaning from the semantic matrix proposed by Frege and still adopted, in one variant or other, in most of contemporary philosophy of language.
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