Economic Statecraft and Atoms for Peace
Economic Statecraft and Atoms for Peace
A Theory of Peaceful Nuclear Assistance
This chapter examines how peaceful nuclear assistance to other states is used by nuclear weapons suppliers as a tool of economic statecraft to influence the behavior of their friends and adversaries. It discusses three main politico-strategic reasons why suppliers engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation: to keep their allies and alliances strong; to constrain their enemies; and to prop up democracies in the international system. It also considers three alternative explanations for peaceful nuclear assistance: countries use atomic assistance to strengthen nonproliferation norms; countries sell nuclear technology to make money; countries offer nuclear assistance to sustain their domestic nuclear industries (for example, suppliers with lower domestic demand for nuclear energy are more likely to provide nuclear assistance than states with a high domestic demand for nuclear energy).
Keywords: peaceful nuclear assistance, nuclear weapons suppliers, economic statecraft, peaceful nuclear cooperation, alliances, enemies, democracies, nonproliferation, nuclear technology, nuclear industries
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