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Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States$
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Gerald M. Easter

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780801451195

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9780801451195.001.0001

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State Meets Society in the Transitional Tax Regime

State Meets Society in the Transitional Tax Regime

Chapter:
(p.86) 4 State Meets Society in the Transitional Tax Regime
Source:
Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States
Author(s):

Gerald M. Easter

Publisher:
Cornell University Press
DOI:10.7591/cornell/9780801451195.003.0005

This chapter examines why people pay taxes by focusing on the way in which the state interacted with society in the transitional tax regime. It first discusses Poland's transitional tax regime, which was based on “legalistic consent,” and Russia's transitional tax regime, which was based on “bureaucratic coercion.” It then explores how these two types of transitional tax regimes were consolidated in Poland and Russia, focusing first on the actions of the state and then on the reactions of society. It shows that postcommunist states were forced to devise the means of revenue extraction from the institutional inheritance of the old regime, whereas postcommunist societies were released from the rigid constraints of the command economy to become autonomous economic actors, and legally anointed taxpayers. Finally, it considers how society responded to the state's new revenue claims with compliance and noncompliance.

Keywords:   transitional tax regime, Poland, legalistic consent, Russia, bureaucratic coercion, postcommunist state, revenue extraction, command economy, compliance, noncompliance

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