The Uneven Effect of Market Reforms
This chapter examines how some people managed rarely or never to engage in the widespread corruption in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It demonstrates that relatively well-off individuals offer others, mainly family members, an alternative to engaging in corruption. By assisting with employment, income, and credit, they enable their family members to meet their needs without approaching government officials with offers of bribes and other favors. Those who do not have financially successful relatives, however, must resort to corruption. Markets, religious organizations, and secular charities also cannot provide them with the goods and services they need because market reform under the conditions of a legacy of significant state economic intervention and weak market-enhancing institutions has limited these institutions' resources.
Cornell Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.