“Phase IV” and the Invasion of Iraq
“Phase IV” and the Invasion of Iraq
This chapter examines the Bush administration's planning of Phase IV—noncombat operations—of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Those ultimately responsible for the invasion of Iraq made many errors in judgment, errors which were reflected in the planning process for Phase IV. A focus on humanitarian issues, coupled with optimistic assumptions about political conditions in Iraq and the necessary length of military occupation, left soldiers unable to perform key tasks once the initial combat phase was complete. Instead of maintaining the flow of forces into the theater of operations to enhance coalition and civilian security, principals in the United States stopped troop deployments and undermined a military command whose postwar structure and responsibilities were already unclear.
Keywords: Bush administration, Phase IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom, invasion of Iraq, humanitarian issues, military occupation, combat phase, civilian security
Cornell Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
