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Chinese Economic StatecraftCommercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control$
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William J. Norris

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780801454493

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9780801454493.001.0001

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Coercive Leverage Across the Taiwan Strait

Coercive Leverage Across the Taiwan Strait

Chapter:
(p.111) 6 Coercive Leverage Across the Taiwan Strait
Source:
Chinese Economic Statecraft
Author(s):

William J. Norris

Publisher:
Cornell University Press
DOI:10.7591/cornell/9780801454493.003.0007

This chapter examines China's attempts to coercively leverage Taiwan's growing economic dependence on the mainland. The evolution of the cross-strait economic relations and China's corresponding strategic use of economics can be usefully broken into two phases, each of which highlights a different strategic logic of economic statecraft. In the early days of the cross-strait economic ties, China was mainly focused on attracting Taiwanese capital investment and management expertise. As the cross-strait economic interaction expanded and deepened throughout the 1990s, China began to consider the possibility of using this economic interaction as a coercive lever of power. This chapter first provides an overview of cross-strait economic ties during the period 1979–1996 before discussing the mainland's shift to a coercive leverage strategy. It then considers Beijing's use of coercive leverage against prominent Taiwanese corporations with mainland operations in order to influence the outcome of Taiwan's presidential elections. It also evaluates the results of China's coercive approach.

Keywords:   cross-strait economic relations, China, economics, economic statecraft, Taiwan, capital investment, coercive leverage, presidential elections

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