This introductory chapter claims that the way autocrats fare in their pursuit of nuclear weapons programs is related to the way they treat their states. For instance, Saddam Hussein solidified his hold on power by proliferating and fragmenting state institutions. On the contrary, Muammar Gaddafi maintained his power by dismantling state institution. These choices later tied their hands by limiting their ability to monitor their nuclear program and to intervene when necessary. Saddam was able to fix some of the problems facing his country's nuclear weapons program, once he decided to intervene; Gaddafi's attempts met with much less success.
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