Pakistan’s Genocide in Bengal and Limited War in Balochistan, 1971–1977
Pakistan’s Genocide in Bengal and Limited War in Balochistan, 1971–1977
This chapter examines why the Pakistani state was so much more indiscriminate and extreme in its use of violence against Bengali secessionists in 1971 than Baloch secessionists three years later. It reveals that the primary reason for the variation in state strategy was the perceived differential in third-party support. The chapter then details how the Bengali movement was deemed to be operating hand-in-glove with the Indian state, while by contrast, the Baloch only received sanctuary from Afghanistan. This distinction between moderate and high levels of third-party support meant that the Bengali movement was deemed a much more significant threat to Pakistan's external security than the Baloch movement was. The chapter also looks at the decision makers and soldiers on the ground who were more aggressive and violent in East Pakistan than they were in Balochistan. It recounts Bangladesh's hard-won freedom from Pakistan and explores how it resulted in significant political instability.
Keywords: Pakistani state, Bengali secessionists, Baloch secessionists, state strategy, third-party support, Bengali movement, Indian state, Afghanistan, Baloch movement, Bangladesh
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