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Tempting FateWhy Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents$

Paul C. Avey

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9781501740381

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: May 2020

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501740381.001.0001

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(p.181) Notes

(p.181) Notes

Source:
Tempting Fate
Author(s):

Paul C. Avey

Publisher:
Cornell University Press

Introduction

(1.) “U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” June 19, 1946, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/65.pdf.

(2.) Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).

(3.) Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

(4.) The Correlates of War data code the NNWS as starting the war or underlying militarized interstate dispute (MID) half the time: Korean War, 1950; Suez War, 1956; Six Day War, 1967; War of Attrition, 1969; October War, 1973; Falklands War, 1982; War over Angola, 1987; Gulf War, 1991. I found 657 MIDs between two states, or dyads, when only one possessed nuclear weapons. Although there are a number of challenges to coding initiation, as I discuss below, using the MID coding, the NNWS initiated approximately 36 percent of disputes. That number increases to 43 percent when including an NNWS that joined on the initiator’s side. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, I found 119 overall crises (many containing multiple dyads) where only one side had nuclear weapons from 1946 to 2015. ICB identified the NNWS as the “triggering entity” in approximately 61 percent of the 87 cases that had a single state actor as the triggering entity. War data are from the Dyadic Inter-state War Data at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war. MID data are from the Dyadic MID data version 3.1, at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs. See Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron Shreve, “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 3 (2019): 811–35. ICB data are from the Dyadic-Level Crisis Data and System-level data, Version 12, at https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/.

(5.) Brodie, Absolute Weapon, 85. Brodie relegated the comment to a footnote. For the Schelling quote see Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science (London: Routledge, 2004), 114.

(6.) Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 38. Pape highlights various constraints on nuclear use but does not develop (p.182) them. See also the discussion in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2nd ed. (2001; New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 129–30.

(7.) James J. Wirtz, “Conclusions,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 322. Wirtz adds that this expectation is frequently challenged, calling traditional deterrence arguments into question.

(8.) Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), chap. 1. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731–45.

(9.) Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller argue that states frequently expand their interests upon acquiring nuclear weapons. This line of argument again points to the general belief that nuclear weapons convey coercive benefits. See Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller, “Questioning the Effects of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 1 (February 2015): 74–92, and Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 87–119.

(10.) Throughout this book I follow Thomas C. Schelling and use the term “coercion” to include both deterrence and compellence. In both cases a state attempts to influence an opponent’s behavior: either to not act (deterrence) or to act (compellence) when the adversary would prefer the opposite. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). See also Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?,” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 3–35; and Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

(11.) Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985): 137–63; Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Keir A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

(12.) Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal, “Winning with the Bomb,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 282, 297.

(13.) Erik Garzke and Dong-Joon Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 209–33.

(14.) Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 123; Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 141–71. For a review of studies that find nuclear-armed states are able to successfully compel opponents, see Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 7–8, 34–38.

(15.) Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 17, 15, 59. See also Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 173–95. For general statements that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence but not compellence see, for example, Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities”; Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, esp. 29–35; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 246. For evidence that a majority, but by no means all, American IR faculty and former national security policy makers share this view see Paul C. Avey, “MAD and Taboo: Expert Views on Nuclear Weapons,” paper presented at the 2018 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

(16.) Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 4 (October 2014): 919–35. See also James D. Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994): 253–57.

(p.183) (17.) To be sure, nuclear weapons may generally provide states with deterrent benefits. That nevertheless leaves a large number of important exceptions that require an explanation. Those exceptions are the focus of this book.

(18.) The strategic-proliferation literature is large and disagrees on the precise conditions under which states will acquire nuclear weapons and the force structure they will ultimately construct. Nevertheless, these explanations share the key intuition that states seek nuclear weapons to enhance their security: to better deter and compel opponents. See, for example, Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Proliferation,” International Security 39, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 7–51; Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 91–129; Nicholas L. Miller, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?,” Security Studies 23, no. 1 (January–March 2014): 33–73; Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,” Security Studies 4, no. 3 (July–September 1995): 463–519.

(19.) M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 61.

(20.) For a similar point regarding disputes between two nuclear powers with asymmetric conventional capabilities see Jasen J. Castillo, “Deliberate Escalation: Nuclear Strategies to Deter or to Stop Conventional Attacks,” in Greenhill and Krause, Coercion, 293. Analysts have applied this basic point to other instances as well, notably US nuclear strategy in the Cold War against the Soviet Union when the latter possessed conventional superiority in Europe, as well as to nuclear-armed states facing overwhelming conventional adversaries today.

(21.) I thank a reviewer for raising this point.

(23.) Art and Greenhill, “Coercion,” 6. In addition to the specific quotes cited in this paragraph see Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2–3; Maria Sperandei, “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy,” International Studies Review 8, no. 2 (June 2006): esp. 259–61.

(24.) Marc Trachtenberg, “Waltzing to Armageddon,” National Interest, Fall 2002, 147.

(25.) For instance, compare the initiator coding for wars from the Correlates of War Interstate War data with the list by Dan Reiter, Alan Stam, and Michael Horowitz. Specific cases are often contentious; Reiter et al. note that North Vietnam could plausibly be coded as starting the Vietnam War against the United States. Even cases where the NNWS is widely regarded as the initiator can follow very different paths. Both Argentina and Egypt “initiated” wars against a nuclear opponent. Argentina’s leaders launched an initially bloodless effort to capture the Falkland Islands, hoping that Britain would not react at all; Egyptian leaders sought to immediately engage Israeli forces in October 1973. Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Aaron Shreve, Fiona Ogunkyoya, Jasper Kaplan, “Dyadic MID Codebook—Version 3.0,” May 24, 2018, 9. Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam, and Michael C. Horowitz, “A Revised Look at Interstate Wars, 1816–2007: Appendix,” October 15, 2014, 18. Miscoding some cases is not problematic if the errors are (1) random and (2) there are a large number of observations. Interstate wars are rare events, and the number of nuclear-armed states few. When dealing with small numbers, changing the coding of even a few data points can easily lead to different results. On these points see Erik Gartzke, “An Apology for Numbers in the Study of National Security … if an Apology Is Really Necessary,” H-Diplo|ISSF Forum, no. 2 (2014): 82; Vipin Narang, “The Use and Abuse of Large-N Methods in Nuclear Studies,” H-Diplo|ISSF Forum, no. 2 (2014): 91–97; Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): esp. 310–13.

(26.) Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 6, see also 135–41.

(27.) James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 578; James D. Fearon, (p.184) “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 246–48; Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” International Organization 64 (Fall 2010): 627–60; T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 16–17; Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 33–34.

(28.) See, for example, Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 49–98; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 88–90; Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 45–70; S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 127–52; Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 38–78.

(29.) See, for example, Jan Ludvik, Nuclear Asymmetry and Deterrence: Theory, Policy and History (London: Routledge, 2017); Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority”; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7–44.

(30.) Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, chap. 1; Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.”

(31.) Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), chap. 8.

(32.) For examples of each position see John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29–54; John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 55–79; Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory Is Possible,” Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 14–27; Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18–19, 30–38, 45, 370–74; Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 41.

(33.) In addition to sources cited in notes 12–14 above see Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft; Francis J. Gavin, “Politics, History and the Ivory Tower–Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (August 2012): 573–600; Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, nos. 1–2 (2015): 38–73; Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” Security Studies 26, no. 4 (October–December 2017): 606–41; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 9–49. See also Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 128–33, 230–32.

(34.) Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 236; Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 184–201; Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 258–77. For a review see David J. Karl, “Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 4 (August 2011): 619–41. For a critique see Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 19–22.

(35.) See, for example, Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo; Avner Cohen, “Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Nuclear Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 104–24; George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequence of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford (p.185) University Press, 2009); T. V. Paul, “Taboo or Tradition? The Non-use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2010): 853–63.

(36.) Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 3, 372; Paul, Tradition of Non-use, chap. 7; T. V. Paul, “Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment,” in The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, ed. T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 19–46; Peter Gizewski, “From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics,” International Journal 51, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 397–419; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29–45; Robert Farley, “The Long Shadow of the Falklands War, National Interest, September 8, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-long-shadow-the-falklands-war-11224?page=show.

(38.) Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 35.

(39.) Huth and Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” 38, see also 34–35; Bruce Martin Russett, “Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?,” Review of Politics 50, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 290.

(40.) Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 372, see also 3. Tannenwald’s discussion of the role of normative and material considerations in accounting for nuclear-armed state decision making is much more nuanced; see esp. 53.

(41.) McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 588. Bundy did not expand on the tradition concept, but it contained a normative component; see 586–88.

(42.) Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 45–47. On American public opinion toward military actions that result in civilian deaths see Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 41–79.

(43.) They thus focus on the regulative rather than the constitutive aspects of the norm.

(45.) Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, chaps. 9–10; Vipin Narang, “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 3 (June 2013): 478–508; Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace?”

(46.) This draws on the basic issue of resolve discussed in “The Argument” section earlier in this chapter. I focus on existing political disputes in which both sides have demonstrated some level of resolve over the issue. A distinct but related claim is that once in a dispute, the weaker side compensates for lack of relative capability with intensity that occasionally allows it to prevail. My argument makes no claim about which side will win the conflict; I focus on the role nuclear weapons play in shaping the scope of the conflict. For discussions and applications to asymmetric conflict see Paul, Asymmetric Conflict, 16–18; Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 12–13, 36; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 530–31, 550–61; Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 34; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 190, 456, 529. For an excellent overview of how different approaches treat resolve, see Chamberlain, Cheap Threats, 7–13.

(47.) Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1988).

(48.) Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 33.

(49.) For example, Michelle Benson, “Extending the Bounds of Power Transition Theory,” International Interactions 33, no. 3 (2007): 211–15; William Moul, “Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers, 1816–1989,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (2003): 468–89; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago (p.186) Press, 1980). Many studies that include a proxy for relative power as a control variable in their analysis similarly find that increasing power asymmetries make war less likely.

(50.) David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen, Toward Nuclear Zero (New York: Routledge, 2010), 91; James E. Doyle, “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?,” Survival 55, no. 1 (2013): 7–34.

1. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Monopoly

(1.) This is the basis of nuclear deterrent and compellent threats. In those cases, nuclear weapons are not detonated but are used in the sense that opponents assess the consequences of detonation and alter their behavior accordingly.

(2.) This draws from Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 2; Glenn Snyder, Deterrence by Punishment and Denial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1959); Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?,” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 3–35; Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), chap. 1. The authors use slightly different terminology, but the core insights focus on whether one is seeking to inflict costs by harming the civilian population or weakening military capabilities.

(3.) Wilson D. Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Barton J. Bernstein, “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991): 149–73; Pape, Bombing to Win, 94–96, 104–6. For a dissenting view that the primary intent was to intimidate the Soviet Union see Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Vintage, 1965). Whether the nuclear strikes were the main reason for the Japanese surrender is a separate question from the motivation for the US strikes. On Japanese decision making see Pape, Bombing to Win, chap. 4; Ward Wilson, “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima,” International Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 162–79.

(4.) The classic discussion of nuclear weapons effects is Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1977).

(5.) Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 25.

(6.) Eden, 20. On US ICBMs see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 1 (2017): 48–57.

(7.) “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson,” May 10, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1964–68, vol. 18, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967, document 214, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/d214. See also the discussion of nuclear weapons against civilian and military targets in Korea and Vietnam in Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 433–68.

(8.) Quoted in Shlomo Aronson, “David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Struggle over Dimona: A Prologue to the Six-Day War and Its (Un)Anticipated Results,” Israel Affairs 15, no. 2 (April 2009): 117.

(9.) Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 118.

(10.) Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 321–23.

(11.) Pape, Bombing to Win; Edward Kaplan, To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 11–14. In arguably the most successful case of independent air power, US and NATO forces enjoyed complete control of the air against an overmatched and isolated Serbian (p.187) opponent. See Daniel R. Lake, “The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO’s ‘Victory’ in Kosovo Revisited,” International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 83–112.

(12.) Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016); Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 43.

(13.) On the limits of precision-guided weapons against a capable adversary see Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess / Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48.

(14.) On the challenges the US air defenses faced against Soviet forces see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 147–72.

(15.) Christine M. Leah, The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament: Strategy and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 4. Limitations in accuracy and yield have restricted the damage that most states throughout history have been able to accomplish with conventional missiles. See, for example, Steve Fetter, George N. Lewis, and Lisbeth Gronlun, “Why Were Scud Casualties So Low?,” Nature 361 (January 28, 1993): 293–96; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 66.

(16.) Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 734. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 33–34.

(17.) Bernstein, “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” 151. These discussions were overly ambitious at the time, but such thinking would develop over the course of the nuclear era.

(18.) Quoted in Bernstein, 166, see also 164–70.

(19.) Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 57, 56, see also chap. 3.

(20.) Kaplan, To Kill Nations, chap. 2; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 89.

(21.) On the difficulties of cratering runways even with nuclear weapons see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 42–43.

(22.) Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 48.

(23.) For example, Lynn Etheridge Davis and Warner R. Schilling, “All You Ever Wanted to Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations but Were Not Cleared to Ask,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 2 (June 1973): 207–42; Michael J. Salman, Kevin J. Sullivan, and Stephen Van Evera, “Analysis or Propaganda? Measuring American Strategic Nuclear Capability, 1969–88,” in Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates, ed. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 172–263; Lieber and Press, “End of MAD?”

(24.) For example, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1 (Spring 2013): esp. 9–10; Art Pine, “Only A-Bomb Could Destroy Libya Plant, Scientist Says,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-24/news/mn-62181_1_weapons-plant; Alyssa Demus, “Conventional versus Nuclear: Assessing Comparative Deterrent Utilities,” American University School of International Service manuscript, August 25, 2012, esp. 14–18, http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/SLTF/Conventional%20Versus%20Nuclear%20Assessing%20Comparative%20Deterrent%20Utilities.pdf.

(25.) “Iran Nuclear Sites May Be Beyond Reach of ‘Bunker Busters,’” Reuters, January 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-strike-idUSTRE80B22020120112; Joby Warrick, “Iran’s Underground Nuclear Sites Not Immune to U.S. Bunker-Busters, Experts Say,” Washington Post, February 29, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/experts-irans-underground-nuclear-sites-not-immune-to-us-bunker-busters/2012/02/24/gIQAzWaghR_story.html?utm_term=.893c93ee5f7c.

(p.188) (26.) The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports that “approximately 1,500 coalition strikes altogether were focused against Iraqi ballistic missile capabilities…. Roughly another 1,000 ‘Scud patrol’ sorties were planned against mobile Scud launchers but ended up attacking other targets.” Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 2, part 1, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1993), 190n98, see also 189 and vol. 2, part 2, 330–32.

(27.) Glaser and Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD?,” 67, see also 66; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 87.

(28.) Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1–2 (2015): 59.

(29.) Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?,” 58. Talmadge was discussing a different situation, but the point applies here.

(32.) Elbridge Colby et al., “The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’ of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis,” CAN Strategic Studies (April 2013): https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final.pdf.

(34.) For instance, low destructiveness avoids problems of destroying assets but may prove ineffective and thereby weaken the coercive value of the NWS arsenal.

(35.) This may be changing; see the discussion on precision-guided munitions.

(36.) Sechser and Furhmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 47; Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 177; Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (February 2013): 191; T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 23–24; John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 14–15, 61–63.

(37.) Austin Long, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Targeting Policy: Necessity and Damage Limitation,” H-Diplo|ISSF Policy Roundtable 1–4 (December 22, 2016), http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-4-nuclear. See also Jeffrey G. Lewis and Scott D. Sagan, “The Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics and the Laws of War,” Daedalus 145, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 62–74.

(43.) Matthew Fuhrmann, “After Armageddon: Pondering the Potential Political Consequences of Third Use,” in Should We Let the Bomb Spread, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2016), 190. See also Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

(44.) On US weakness in 1950–51 relative to 1953–54 and its effect on US policy see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 3; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 106; Rosemary J. Foot, “Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded War, December 1950–January 1951,” Diplomatic History 10, no. 1 (January 1986): 43–57.

(45.) These are similar to various “soft balancing” mechanisms. See, for example, Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 36–37.

(p.189) (46.) One notable exception is World War II. US conventional bombing against Japan throughout 1945 killed far more than the two nuclear bombs did. The US atomic bombs were therefore not an escalation in the level of violence. For speculation that American nuclear use prior to 1945 might have caused Japan to expand its level of violence see Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1988), 267–68.

(47.) Kenneth N. Waltz, “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” in Sagan and Waltz, Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 141; Gaddis, We Now Know, 106; Mueller, Atomic Obsession, 14–15, 63. For a similar statement see William W. Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” in Military Policy and National Security, ed. William W. Kauffman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 106–7.

(48.) Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 9–49.

(49.) Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House Large Print, 1995), 738; Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 300–301; Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (New York: Random House, 2015), 463.

(50.) Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 3; Peter D. Feaver, “Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management: A Debate,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (October–December 1995): 771.

(51.) Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9–46; Matthew Kroenig, “Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy,” Security Studies 23, no. 1 (January–March 2014): 1–32.

(54.) On emulation see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 127–28; Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 80–124; Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 51–86.

(56.) Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo; Paul, Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons; T. V. Paul, “Taboo or Tradition? The Non-use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2010): 853–63. On the general evolution of norms against harming civilians see Lewis and Sagan, “Nuclear Necessity Principle,” 62–72; Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats, 45–47. The classic modern statement on just war remains Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (1977; New York: Basic Books, 2000), esp. chap. 17.

(57.) On limitations see Press, Sagan, and Valentino, “Atomic Aversion”; Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 41–79; Downes, Targeting Civilians in War. That US planners take just-war principles of distinction and proportionality into account in targeting see C. Robert Kehler, “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Use,” Daedalus 145, no. 4 (Fall 2016). Though critics contend this is insufficient; see, for example, Lewis and Sagan, “Nuclear Necessity Principle.”

(59.) For discussions of technological change and its limitations see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), esp. chaps. 4, 7, 9; Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March–April 1996): 37–54; Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002); Lieber and Press, “New Era of Counterforce”; Lieber and Press, “End of MAD?”; Glaser and Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD?,” 62–80, 97.

(p.190) (60.) Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, July 7, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.

(61.) Dennis M. Gormley, “US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions: Assessing the Risks, Benefits, and Arms Control Implications,” Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 2 (2015): 129, see also 133; Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence,” 32, 35.

(64.) Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 43–45; Paul, Tradition of Non-use, 185–88; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’ Leaves Some Uneasy,” New York Times, January 11, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/science/as-us-modernizes-nuclear-weapons-smaller-leaves-some-uneasy.html?_r=0.

(65.) Nuclear weapons might still be useful at deterring nuclear strikes by other nuclear powers, but this is outside the scope of nuclear monopoly. Of course, if nuclear weapons had no advantage relative to conventional alternatives then it is unclear why a state would need a nuclear weapon to deter a nuclear strike that provided no benefit to the first user.

(66.) Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 135.

(68.) As Bernard Brodie speculated, in a war between two nuclear states, “one side or the other would feel that its relative position respecting [the] ability to use the bomb might deteriorate as the war progressed, and that if it failed to use the bomb while it had the chance it might not have the chance later on.” Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 86. Nuclear weapons pose a particularly dangerous threat to nuclear arsenals because they are the best means to degrade or eliminate nuclear platforms and storage facilities. Michael Salman, Kevin J. Sullivan, and Stephen Van Evera, “Analysis or Propaganda? Measuring American Strategic Nuclear Capability, 1969–88,” in Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates, ed. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Lieber and Press, “End of MAD?”; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New Missions,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 84–126; Glaser and Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD?”

(69.) The fear within the NWS can be mitigated if the NWS has a large and diverse nuclear arsenal and the NNWS has very limited conventional capabilities.

(70.) Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 3.

(72.) Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 48.

(73.) Lieber and Press, “New Era of Counterforce,” 17–18; and Austin Long’s contribution to Austin Long, Dinshaw Mistry, and Bruce M. Sugden, “Correspondence: Going Nowhere Fast; Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 166–72.

(74.) Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 3. During the Cold War, thinking on limited wars centered on strategies that the United States could pursue to prevent escalation to a major US-Soviet nuclear confrontation. See, for example, Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare”; Spencer D. Bakich, Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 21–24; and the discussion in Steven Peter Rosen, “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,” International Security 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 84–87.

(75.) Ivan Arrequín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 103.

(p.191) (76.) I borrow “mechanized” from Pape, Bombing to Win, rather than labeling the strategy conventional to avoid confusion with the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.

(78.) On manufacturing superiority and defensive advantage see Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, chap. 2; Biddle, Military Power, chap. 3.

(80.) Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1976; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 81, 80, see also 91–94. Emphasis in original.

(81.) On Iraqi behavior see chap. 2. On Chinese and Soviet efforts at civil defense measures see chaps. 4–5. The United States explored and briefly implemented the Pentomic Division structure in the 1950s, part of which centered on greater dispersal to enable operation on a nuclear battlefield. A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986). On US, British, and Canadian civil defense and efforts to increase morale see, for example, Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); Wm. F. Vandercook, “Making the Very Best of the Very Worst: The ‘Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons,’ Report of 1956,” International Security 11, no. 1 (Summer 1986): 184–95.

(82.) Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 40.

(83.) Michael C. Horowitz and Neil Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 3 (April 2014): 509–35.

(84.) In contrast to chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons are effective against military forces, there is little or no defense available, and nuclear weapons can visit much greater immediate destruction. As such, facing a nuclear adversary, an NWS would have strong first-strike incentives to eliminate or at least degrade the opponent’s nuclear arsenal. Mueller, Atomic Obsession, 11–15; Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?,” esp. 514–16.

(85.) Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” esp. 738–41; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 627; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 244–46; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 44–45.

(86.) Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism–Pessimism Debate,” Security Studies 12, no. 1 (Autumn 2002): 59; Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): chap. 2; Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 137; Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory Is Possible,” Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 25–27; Glaser and Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD?,” 54–62.

(89.) One American concern during the Cold War was that the Soviets would fight “the war in such a way as to delay NATO taking the decision to use nuclear weapons until it was too late for them to influence the outcome of the war.” Quoted in Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 53. Though these dynamics are very different from nuclear monopoly, the point is that officials have at times worried a conventional conflict could proceed past the point when nuclear weapons would be effective at reversing the situation.

(90.) Todd S. Sechser, “A Bargaining Theory of Coercion,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 55–76.

(91.) On costly signaling see James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90.

(93.) Quoted in Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 16.

(94.) Steven D. Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 161–76.

(96.) George H. Quester, “If the Nuclear Taboo Gets Broken,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 78.

(97.) Sagan and Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran.” Though see Abigail S. Post and Todd S. Sechser, “Norms, Public Opinion, and the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” unpublished manuscript.

(98.) The key exception to this would be if a weak NWS directly attacked a stronger NNWS’s homeland. In that case the NWS would likely act in its own defense, resulting in war. Historically there do not appear to have been any such wars. See chaps. 2–5 and appendix B.

(99.) Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), esp. chaps. 9–10; David Collier, James Mahoney, and Jason Seawright, “Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 94–98; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Social Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 58–67.

(100.) For details on the data see the individual chapters and appendix A.

(101.) Biddle, Military Power, chap. 3; Ryan Grauer and Michael C. Horowitz, “What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System,” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (January–March 2012): 83–112; Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

(102.) Sebastian Rosato, Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 17–18.

(104.) See introduction chapter.

(105.) This resembles John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement. The analyst examines cases where a phenomenon is present (conflict in nuclear monopoly) to determine if the cases share certain underlying characteristics even though they differ in most other aspects. For a discussion see James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Assessment in Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341–47, 351–52.

(106.) Conventional states fighting other conventional states cannot abstain from threatening nonexistent nuclear forces.

(107.) This portion of the analysis examines only cases of war. I do not examine cases of nonwar where the NNWS may have planned major operations. Comparison against a background condition can still provide useful information, though. See Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 46–47, 58–61.

2. Iraq versus the United States

(1.) For a counterfactual analysis of the 1991 Gulf War if Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons see Barry R. Posen, “U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear Armed World Or: What if Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons?,” Security Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 1–31.

(3.) Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 135.

(4.) Caitlin Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War,” Security Studies 22, no. 2 (2013): 180–221.

(p.193) (6.) Joshua Rovner, “Delusion of Defeat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2014): 482–507; Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).

(7.) Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978–2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 221–22.

(8.) Quoted in Jon Meachem, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (New York: Random House, 2015), 463.

(9.) Quoted in Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 459.

(10.) George [H. W.] Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 463.

(11.) “U.S. Forces Have No Nuclear Arms in Gulf States, No Plans to Use Them,” Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1990, A6, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-02/news/mn-1732_1_tactical-nuclear-weapons.

(12.) F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50–51.

(14.) For the claim that the Ba’ath regime was less than committed to pan-Arabism see Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9–10.

(15.) Quoted in Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?,” International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 149.

(16.) Brands and Palkki, 134–35. This is consistent with my broader argument. In a major war in which Iraq sought to take large portions of Israeli territory through military means and potentially threaten Israel’s survival, the benefits of nuclear use would increase to Israel. To offset that would thus require an Iraqi nuclear capability. This is discrete from Egyptian planning in 1973 that sought to take only limited territory and rely on political means to reacquire the Sinai, relying as well on the United States to constrain Israel.

(17.) Gause, International Relations, 70, 78–84; Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015): 148; Hal Brands, “Inside the Iraqi State Records: Saddam Hussein, ‘Irangate,’ and the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2011): 95–118; Hal Brands and David Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards’: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic View of the United States,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 3 (June 2012): 641–45.

(18.) Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 169. See also Brands and Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards,’” 657; Amatzi Baram, “Deterrence Lessons from Iraq: Rationality Is Not the Only Key to Containment,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 82.

(19.) Public Broadcasting System, Frontline, “Oral History: Tariq Aziz,” https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html, originally broadcast January 9, 1996.

(20.) See per capita GDP figures in Gleditsch, version 6.0, http://ksgleditsch.com/exptradegdp.html.

(22.) Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI, NSA, Interview Session 9, February 24, 2004, 1, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/10.pdf. The general collection is available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/.

(23.) Brands and Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards,’” 652–57; F. Gregory Gause III, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” Middle East Journal 56, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 55–59.

(26.) PBS Frontline “Oral History: Tariq Aziz.” See also “Saddam and Members of the Ba’ath Party Discuss the Letter That Tariq Aziz Will Send to the Secretary of the Arab League Laying Out Iraq’s Grievances toward Kuwait,” undated [shortly before July 15, 1990], in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 169–71.

(27.) Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI, NSA, Interview Session 9, February 24, 2004, 3, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/10.pdf.

(p.194) (28.) Quoted in Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 49.

(30.) Saddam Hussein quoted in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 48.

(31.) Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI, NSA, Interview Session 9, February 24, 2004, 5, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/10.pdf. Aziz later characterized the war as defensive as well; see PBS Frontline, “Oral History: Tariq Aziz.”

(33.) On the US footprint see Joshua R. Rovner and Caitlin Talmadge, “Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil,” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (2014): 568–71.

(34.) See, for example, Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

(36.) “Confrontation in the Gulf: Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” September 23, 1990, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html?pagewanted=all.

(37.) US Embassy Baghdad to US Secretary of State, “Saddam’s Message of Friendship to President Bush,” July 25, 1990, 11, 2, Washington Post, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/glaspie1-13.pdf?sid=ST2008040203634.

(38.) “U.S. Messages on July 1990 Meeting of Hussein and American Ambassador,” New York Times, July 13, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/13/world/us-messages-on-july-1990-meeting-of-hussein-and-american-ambassador.html.

(41.) Aziz’s statement was in response to the question: “In April, what was your assessment of what the Americans would do—what was April Glaspie saying?” By “April,” the interviewer likely meant Ambassador Glaspie’s first name. But it is possible that Aziz was referring to a meeting in April 1990 in which Ambassador Glaspie was present. However, immediately prior to Aziz’s comment that Glaspie “didn’t tell us anything strange” he was referencing the July 25 meeting, noting that during it a call came from President Mubarak. That call appears in the American minutes of the July 25 meeting. This suggests the comment was in fact in reference to the July 25 meeting. For the Aziz interview and statement see PBS Frontline, “Oral History: Tariq Aziz.” For the US minutes noting the call from Mubarak see US Embassy Baghdad to US Secretary of State, “Saddam’s Message of Friendship to President Bush,” July 25, 1990.

(44.) On general versus immediate deterrence see Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 3.

(45.) UN Security Council Resolution 678, November 29, 1990, https://undocs.org/S/RES/678(1990).

(46.) Quotes in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 109. See also SH-PDWN-D-000-533, “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Soviet Delegation,” October 6 to October 10, 1990, Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), 18–20. I use the CRRC pagination whenever citing directly from their collection.

(p.195) (50.) Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 215–16; Gause, International Relations, 112–13; Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 62–63; Serge Schmemann, “Iraqi Aide Arrives for Moscow Talks,” New York Times, February 18, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/18/world/war-in-the-gulf-soviet-union-iraqi-aide-arrives-for-moscow-talks.html.

(53.) “Just before the Ground War Began, Saddam Discussed His Plans to Withdraw Iraqi Forces from Kuwait,” February 23, 1991, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 189–91, esp. 190, and 192n53; Woods, Mother of All Battles, 214. On February 22, Secretary of State Baker told President Bush and President François Mitterrand of France that the Soviets informed him that Iraq had agreed to withdraw from Kuwait City in four days, with total withdrawal in twenty-one days. He added that the Soviet ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh informed him that “the Iraqis have agreed to remove the requirement that economic sanctions be eliminated…. There are no linkages. There are no references to other problems in the region. There are no conditions. It is a very big move.” George Bush phone call with French President (Mitterrand), February 22, 1991, 4, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/D9589C94D7604DAD8528CF714D596751.pdf.

(54.) George Bush phone call with Gorbachev, February 23, 1991, 1, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/9D3A7B1E9D864FC08BF72CB4A4844486.pdf.

(56.) Woods, Mother of All Battles, 210. See also the discussion in the “Iraqi Nuclear Views” section later in this chapter.

(57.) George Bush phone call with French President (Mitterrand), February 22, 1991, 5; see also George Bush phone call to Gorbachev, February 22, 1991, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/2983E547B0624D329FDA6653F9FC3506.pdf; and George Bush phone call with Gorbachev, February 23, 1991, 2–3.

(59.) SH-SHTP-A-000-630, “Saddam and His Advisers Discussing the Soviet Union and the State of the Iraqi Military,” February 24, 1991, 12, http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/01/SH-SHTP-A-000-630_TF.pdf. The general site is http://crrc.dodlive.mil/collections/sh/. The February 24 documents are also available in combined form at the New York Times online at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/transcripts-of-conversations-between-saddam-hussein-and-his-advisors; https://int.nyt.com/data/int-shared/nytdocs/docs/559/559.pdf.

(60.) SH-SHTP-A-000-931, “Saddam and His Advisers Discussing the US Ground Attack during the 1991 Gulf War,” February 24, 1991, 8, http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/01/SH-SHTP-A-000-931_TF.pdf.

(61.) Kevin M. Woods and Mark E. Stout, “Saddam’s Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of ‘Desert Storm,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 1 (February 2010), 5–41; and Woods, Mother of All Battles, 304–5.

(62.) Gause, International Relations, 119–20; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (2006; New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 8–10.

(64.) Gause, International Relations, 121–123; “Crisis Summary #422: UNSCOM-I,” International Crisis Behavior Dataset (ICB), http://www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=422.

(65.) “Crisis Summary #429: UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox,” ICB, http://www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=429.

(66.) Ricks, Fiasco, 18–22. Desert Fox essentially finished off any lingering nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons programs and ambitions, most of which had already been abandoned in the wake of the Gulf War in the face of inspections and sanctions. Rovner, “Delusion of Defeat,” 495, 497–98.

(p.196) (68.) Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), chap. 4.

(72.) Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 235–37.

(73.) “Saddam Appraises American and International Reactions to the Invasion of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 175.

(76.) Quoted in Woods, 52. See also Pollack, Arabs at War, 237.

(77.) “Saddam Appraises American and International Reactions to the Invasion of Kuwait,” August 7, 1990, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 176.

(78.) SH-SHTP-A-000-931, “Saddam and His Advisers Discussing the US Ground Attack during the 1991 Gulf War,” February 24, 1991, 4.

(83.) “Saddam Appraises American and International Reactions to the Invasion of Kuwait,” August 7, 1991, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 175.

(85.) Quoted in Woods, 115. Woods cites this meeting taking place on November 2, 1990; see notes 91 and 98 on page 123 and the document identifier on page 335. However, a slightly different translation of this passage appears in CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-670, “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council,” 25–26, which reports the date of the meeting as October 11, 1990. An excerpt from that document also appears in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 35–37, but the excerpt does not include the passage from Taha Ramadan. The document date there is listed as “circa late October 1990” in the document title but October 11, 1990, in the footnote; see page 35. Some of the information discussed during the meeting would suggest that a date of late October is most appropriate for the meeting, such as reference to statements by Vice President Cheney that were reported on October 25 and 26.

(86.) “Saddam and His Inner Circle Analyze U.S. Domestic Politics, American Warnings, and the Likelihood of U.S. Military Action against Iraq,” late October 1990, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 37. Note also that this reveals the widespread belief within Iraq that the United States could not win quickly, providing time for Iraq to inflict casualties. See also Woods, Mother of All Battles, 114.

(90.) Quoted in Woods, 113.

(91.) Quoted in Woods, 95.

(93.) Quoted in Benjamin Buch and Scott D. Sagan, “Our Red Lines and Theirs,” Foreign-Policy.Com, December 13, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/13/our-red-lines-and-theirs/.

(96.) SH-MISC-D-000-783, “Saddam Hussein Speech Drafts,” August 12, 1990, CRRC, 10–13.

(98.) SH-SHTP-A-001-042 “Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council Discussing the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the Expected U.S. Attack,” December 29, 1990, CRRC, 11, http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/06/SH-SHTP-A-001-042.pdf. An excerpt from this document is available in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 243–46. Hammadi did not reference nuclear weapons specifically. He was joining a discussion by Izzat al-Duri and Ali Hassan Majid that raised concerns that public preparation and discussion of the effects of potential nuclear strikes were harming Iraqi morale.

(99.) Woods, Mother of All Battles, 151–56; Richard L. Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam,” Middle East Journal 59, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 199–204; Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. Peter Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 67–68.

(100.) SH-SHTP-A-000-810, “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Delegation of Jordanian Arab Democratic Youth,” December 25, 1990, CRRC, 1.

(102.) “Saddam and His Inner Circle Discuss Iraq’s WMD Capabilities and Deterrent Threats,” undated [circa mid-November 1990], in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 239. The discussion included both deterrent threats and actual use of chemical weapons. It is not entirely clear to which Aziz was referring, but if threats invited a nuclear response, then actual use would as well. Moreover, Saddam did publicly state Iraq might use chemical weapons, suggesting Aziz’s main concern was actual use. See also Baram, “Deterrence Lessons from Iraq,” 85.

(103.) “Saddam’s Personal Involvement in WMD Planning,” undated [circa second week of January, 1991], in Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, vol. 1, September 2004, 99, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001156395.pdf.

(105.) Quoted in Meachem, Destiny and Power, 463. See also Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 95.

(106.) On Secretary Baker’s warning see Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 221–22. In addition, Sagan and Buch highlight that in Saddam Hussein’s “post-capture interrogation, the Iraqi leader claimed not to know that Baker’s threats were even connected with the use of chemical weapons.” See Buch and Sagan, “Our Red Lines and Theirs.”

(107.) To the extent American threats were credible, then, this suggests it was because Iraqi leaders already considered that the use of chemical weapons would raise the risks of a nuclear strike.

(108.) “Saddam and His Advisers Discuss Iraqi Missile Attacks on Targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia,” undated [circa January 17 or 18, 1991], in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 251. See also Duelfer, Comprehensive Report, 1:33–34.

(110.) Woods, 150, also 155; and “Saddam’s Personal Involvement in WMD Planning,” second week of January 1991, in Duelfer, Comprehensive Report, 1:97–100.

(111.) McCarthy and Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal,” 70, also 68–69; Duelfer, Comprehensive Report, 1:33, 97–100; Woods, Mother of All Battles, 154–56 and 170n114. Some of Saddam’s comments can be interpreted as broadening this to include retaliation for chemical or biological strikes against Iraq, for example, “Saddam and His Advisers Discuss Iraqi Missile Attacks on Targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, undated [circa January 17–18, 1991], 251. There is also some evidence that Saddam delegated launch authority if the United States invaded Baghdad. See Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy,” 201. However, Woods et al. report finding “no evidence in the tapes indicating that Saddam believed American fear of Iraqi chemical or (p.198) biological weapon attacks on Israel or the United States deterred an American push toward Baghdad”: Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 236.

(112.) SH-SHTP-A-000-931, “Saddam Hussein Meeting with Advisors regarding the American Ground Attack during First Gulf War,” February 24, 1991, 12, http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/01/SH-SHTP-A-000-931_TF.pdf; SH-SHTP-A-000-666, “Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Officials Discussing a US-led Attack on Faylakah Island and the Condition of the Iraqi Army,” February 24, 1991, 14, http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/01/SH-SHTP-A-000-666_TF.pdf;and Woods, Mother of All Battles, 132, 136, 179, 210–11.

(113.) “Iraq Considers How to Counteract the Coalition Air Assault,” January 13, 1991, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 181. For a slightly different translation see Woods, Mother of All Battles, 179.

(114.) “Saddam Predicts the Effects Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Would Have on Conventional Warfare with Israel,” March 27, 1979, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 224.

(116.) Quoted in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 154. See also Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 252–53, note 82; and SH-MISC-D-000-298, “Daily Statements regarding the Iraq War in 1991,” entry for February 7, 1991, CRRC, 16.

(117.) Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris report that the Pershing II was operational through 1991, with the last missile shipped from West Germany on March 13, 1991. Woods reports the United States destroyed the last Pershing missile in May 1991. Though Iraqi discussion seems to have centered on ground-launched missiles, it is possible that some Iraqi officials were referring to (or confusing the Pershing with) Tomahawk ship-launched cruise missiles. Nonnuclear variants were used during the 1991 Gulf War. The US Navy fired 288 conventional Tomahawks during the conflict from surface vessels and submarines. On these points see Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris, The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 176–77, 196–98; and Woods, Mother of All Battles, 169–70, note 112.

(119.) CRRC has over one hundred pages of internal Iraqi documents discussing civil defense plans in the event of a nuclear attack in the collection SH-IDGS-D-001-431, “Correspondence between the Presidential Diwan and several other Iraqi authorities discussing an emergency evacuation plan of different Iraqi cities in the case of a nuclear attack.” I identify the specific documents when citing from this collection. See also the brief discussion in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 153–54; and Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 236.

(120.) SH-IDGS-D-001-431, “The Evacuation Plan of the City of Baghdad upon the Sudden Use of Nuclear Weapons—Attachment in Ministry of Interior to Baghdad Municipality,” circa October 24, 1990, CRRC, source document p. 107.

(121.) SH-IDGS-D-001-431, “Evaluation of the Evacuation Drill of Saddam City,” December 29, 1990, CRRC, 1–2.

(122.) SH-SHTP-A-001-042, “The Revolutionary Command Council Discusses Civil Defense Measures and Iraqi Morale in the Face of Potential Nuclear Strikes,” December 29, 1990, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 243. All subsequent references to this document rely on the full version of the meeting at http://crrc.dodlive.mil/files/2013/06/SH-SHTP-A-001-042.pdf.

(123.) SH-SHTP-A-001-042, “The Revolutionary Command Council Discusses Civil Defense Measures and Iraqi Morale in the Face of Potential Nuclear Strikes,” December 29, 1990, CRRC, 8

(124.) SH-SHTP-A-001-042, “The Revolutionary Command Council Discusses Civil Defense Measures and Iraqi Morale in the Face of Potential Nuclear Strikes,” December 29, 1990, CRRC, 16. While Saddam’s statement is disturbing, it has, admittedly, more thoughtful analogues elsewhere. For instance, Paul Shulte notes that during the 1961 Berlin crisis “President John Kennedy called on his countrymen to learn what to do to protect their families in case of a nuclear attack.” Paul Shulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 35. For (p.199) general discussions of civil defense preparations see Tracy D. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

(125.) Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 75.

3. Egypt versus Israel

(1.) Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Nuclear Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 288, 291; Zeev Maoz, “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy,” International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 60–61; Yair Evron, “The Relevance and Irrelevance of Nuclear Options in Conventional Wars: The 1973 October War,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 7, nos. 1–2 (1984): 143–76.

(2.) Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 274; Narang, Nuclear Strategy, 183–84, 284–86. Most quantitative datasets code Israel acquiring a nuclear weapon at this time. For example, see Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 151–60.

(4.) Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2013): 78; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 5 (September/October 2010): 81; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, “Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 2 (September/October 2002): 73–75; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Israeli Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70, no. 6 (2014): 97–115; Avner Cohen, “How Nuclear Was It? New Testimony on the 1973 Yom Kippur War,” October 2013, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/206909/israel-nuclear-weapons-and-the-1973-yom-kippur-war/#_ftn1; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 2008, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/080603_israel_syria_wmd.pdf; Federation of American Scientists, “WMD around the World: Israel,” https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html; Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman, “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development Facilities,” Center for International and Strategic Studies (March 2009), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf; Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen, William McCants, Bradley Morris, and William Rosenau, The Israeli “Nuclear Alert” of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis, CNA (April 2013), 22, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final.pdf.

(5.) Avner Cohen, “The 1967 Six-Day War: New Israeli Perspective, 50 Years Later,” Wilson Center, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, June 3, 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war.

(6.) The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) reports that Israel had fifteen Vautour light jet bombers in service in 1967: see IISS, The Military Balance, 1967, 40. On Vautour strikes against Iraq see Lon Nordeen, Fighters over Israel (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 67–68. The Mirage III aircraft was nuclear capable, although the variant the Israelis possessed was the Mirage IIIC, which was primarily an interceptor. Aronson identifies a subsonic French light bomber as a possible delivery platform, though not stating the Vautour by name. Shlomo Aronson, “Israel’s Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and Its Ramifications,” Israel Affairs 6, nos. 3–4 (2000): 92. On French use of the Mirage IIIE as a nuclear delivery platform see Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 261–63.

(7.) Avner Cohen, “Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the 1967 and 1973 Wars,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, eds. Peter Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University (p.200) Press, 2000), 117–19; Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 225–26; Colby et al., Israeli “Nuclear Alert.” On Israeli capabilities see also the IISS Military Balance volumes for 1967 through 1973; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Israel/Missile” November 2012, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/delivery-systems/; and Norris et al., “Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002,” 73–75. Norris et al. provide an estimated range for the Jericho I of 1,200 km in their table of Israeli Strategic Forces, but note that original Israeli interests centered on a missile with a range of 235–500 km. Other sources report ranges closer to 500 km; see, e.g., SNIE 4-1-74, “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency, August 23, 1974, 22, National Security Archive (NSA) Electronic Briefing Book (EBB) 240, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf; Cordesman, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction”; FAS (Federation of American Scientists), “Jericho 1,” https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/missile/jericho-1.htm. On Israeli assurances with the Skyhawk see Zach Levey, “The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 2 (April 2004): 273. For the Phantom see Warnke to Rabin, November 27, 1968, Israel Crosses the Threshold Collection, NSA, EBB 189, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-03d.pdf and https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm. At times the Israelis hedged their guarantees; see Telegram from Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 11, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 20, 490–92, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d250.

(9.) Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), 76–77; Shlomo Aronson with Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 130–31.

(12.) Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and Egyptian National Security Affairs Adviser Hafiz Ismail, February 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 76. See also Secret Talks with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 25, 1973, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA), Kissinger Transcripts (hereafter KT), item KT00681, 12.

(13.) Secret Meeting with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 26, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00682, 28. Interestingly, Ismail immediately interrupted Dr. Ghanin and stated, “We are not discussing this.” This may reflect Egyptian wariness on sharing with the United States how much Egypt knew of the Israeli nuclear capability. Alternatively, it may reflect Ismail’s desire not to discuss the issue in front of such a large group, perhaps preferring to raise the matter off the record and in private with Kissinger.

(14.) Quoted in Richard B. Parker, ed., The October War: A Retrospective (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 119.

(15.) Shlomo Aronson, “David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Struggle over Dimona: A Prologue to the Six-Day War and Its (Un)Anticipated Results,” Israel Affairs 15, no. 2 (2009): 120–21; Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What That Means for the World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 273–74.

(16.) Secret Conversation with Hafiz Ismail in France, May 20, 1973, DNSA, KT, KT00732, 17. See also Kissinger to Nixon, May 20, 1973, FRUS 1969–1973, vol. 25, 189.

(18.) Dan Sagir, “How the Fear of Israel Nukes Helped Seal the Egypt Peace Deal,” Haaretz, November 26, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-how-fear-of-israeli-nukes-helped-seal-the-egypt-peace-deal-1.5626679. On general Egyptian concerns see also Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture, 1960–1967,” Israel Studies 1, no. 1 (1996).

(19.) Rusk to Johnson, May 10, 1965, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 18, 455, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/d214.

(20.) Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 93–94.

(p.201) (21.) CINC comprises six measures, including population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy production, military expenditures, and military personnel.

(22.) IISS, The Military Balance, vol. 67, no. 1, to vol. 79, no. 1 (annual editions from 1967 to 1979).

(23.) Saad El Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), 22.

(24.) George W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000), 12–13; George W. Gawrych, “The Egyptian High Command in the 1973 War,” Armed Forces and Society 13, no. 4 (Summer 1987): 535–46; Pollack, Arabs at War, 58, 82–84; Risa Brooks, “An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt’s Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 412–19.

(27.) Pollack, Arabs at War, 88–98; Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), chap. 4

(29.) Brooks, 427; John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 155–60; Parker, October War, 37; Pollack, Arabs at War, 99–104.

(30.) Parker, October War, chap. 3; Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt, trans. Gillian Potter, Nadra Morcos, and Rosette Frances (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1993), 222; Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 159–62; Craig Daigle, Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 195, 281–82; Thomas W. Lippman, Hero of the Crossing: How Anwar Sadat and the 1973 War Changed the World (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 1.

(31.) Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

(32.) Ryan Grauer and Michael C. Horowitz, “What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System,” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (January–March 2012): 83–112. Coding for specific operations is contained in their Stata .dta file, http://www.michaelchorowitz.com/data/.

(33.) Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 143–44, 150–55. For the similarity of what Mearsheimer labels a blitzkrieg strategy with Biddle’s discussion of breakthrough and exploitation, compare Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 35–43, to Biddle, Military Power, 40–42. On Egyptian shift from a defense in depth to a forward defense see Pollack, Arabs at War, 61.

(34.) Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 51.

(39.) Maria Post Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 118.

(40.) Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 114–15; Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, 101–2; Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 127.

(42.) Nasser would officially abrogate the cease-fire on April 1, 1969, while Egyptian spokesman noted as early as March 12, 1969, that Egypt would no longer be bound by the cease-fire. See Pollack, Arabs at War, 92; Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, 107–8; Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 135; Isabella Ginor, “‘Under the Yellow Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes’: Operation Kavkaz and the War of Attrition, 1969–70,” Cold War History 13, no. 1 (October 2002), 135.

(46.) Gawrych, 106, see also 103–6.

(47.) Quoted in Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 63. See also Daigle, Limits of Détente, 39.

(52.) Sadat’s appointment as Egypt’s president was confirmed by public referendum in October 15, 1970.

(53.) Diplomatic Relations Initiative between Egypt and Israel, February 8, 1971, DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, item KA04892. On the proposal and Sadat’s intentions see Daigle, Limits of Détente, 163; Donald Neff, Warriors against Israel (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988), 45–46; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 86–89.

(55.) Discussion of Middle East Settlement with Mahmoud Riad, October 7, 1971, DNSA, KT, item KT00361, 2.

(58.) Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and Egyptian National Security Affairs Adviser Hafiz Ismail, February 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 74.

(60.) Quoted in Daigle, 213.

(61.) Quoted in Daigle, 219; see also 195–201, 212, 216–20, 232–34, 265–68, 286–87; and Victor Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 16–19.

(64.) Quoted in Daigle, 283.

(65.) Ashraf Ghorbal remarks in Parker, October War, 36, see also 21, 36–37, 48, 53–57, 70–76; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 110–11; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 87–90.

(66.) Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and Egyptian National Security Affairs Adviser Hafiz Ismail, February 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 73–76; Secret Meeting with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 25, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00681, 2; and secret conversation with Hafiz Ismail in France, May 20, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00732, 17.

(68.) Quoted in Daigle, 259.

(69.) See also Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2015, 30.

(71.) Discussion of Middle East Settlement with Mahmoud Riad, October 7, 1971, DNSA, KT, item KT00361, 1.

(72.) Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and Egyptian National Security Affairs Adviser Hafiz Ismail, February 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 75. Ismail raised the point again with Kissinger two days later; see Secret Meeting with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 25, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00681, 7, 32. Ismail told Secretary Rogers that Egypt hoped “to persuade the U.S. to change its policy in the Middle East to one which would not be based on what Egypt considers total support for Israel.” Memorandum of Conversation between US Secretary of State William Rogers and Egyptian National Security Affairs Adviser Hafiz Ismail, February 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 78n3.

(74.) Secret Conversation with Hafiz Ismail in France, May 20, 1973, DNSA, 10, 17. See also the Egyptian complaint over US arms sales in March in Backchannel Message from the Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs (Ismail) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), March 20, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 122.

(77.) Quoted in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 72. Sadat recalled making a similar statement to Nasser: “even 10cm on the other side of the canal would change the situation in the western, eastern, and Arab realms equally.” Quoted in Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 114.

(78.) Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid I. Brezhnev, June 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 221.

(79.) Kissinger to Nixon, February 23, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 70n3.

(80.) Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 268. See also Kissinger’s statements to Ismail in Secret Meeting with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 25, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00681, 21; and Secret Meeting with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 26, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00682 17. On Kissinger’s intention to stall during 1973 see Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin, February 22, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 63–65; Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, March 30, 1973, FRUS 1969–76, vol. 25, 125–29, esp. 126–27; State Department Involvement in Middle East Peace Negotiations, February 22, 1973, DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, item KA09582, esp. 1, 5; and Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, September 10, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, esp. 266–67. For a general discussions of Kissinger’s views see Daigle, Limits of Détente, 34, 72, 120–22, 236, 243–46, 250–60, 268–69, 281. For a minority view in Washington, in line with Nixon, that the likelihood of conflict in late 1973 was 50–50 because Sadat “seems on the verge of concluding that only limited hostilities against Israel stood any real chance of breaking the negotiating stalemate by forcing the big powers to intervene with an imposed solution” see the Editorial Note discussing the May 31, 1973, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report in FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 193–194; and Roger Merrick’s remarks in Parker, October War, 113–16.

(87.) Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 135–44; Daigle, Limits of Détente, chap. 3; Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, 106–18; Pollack, Arabs at War, 90–98; Ginor, “‘Under the Yellow Arab Helmet’”; Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, chap. 4; Dima P. Adamsky, “‘Zero-Hour for the Bears’: Inquiring into the Soviet Decision to Intervene in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, 1969–70,” Cold War History 6, no. 1 (2006): 113–36. Soviet motives for support varied, but there is general agreement Nasser sought greater Soviet involvement in December–January 1969–1970 as Israeli attacks pummeled Egyptian air defenses and then moved to deeppenetration strikes.

(91.) Shazly, Crossing of the Suez, 36–37; Avraham Sela, “The 1973 Arab War Coalition: Aims, Coherence, and Gains-Distribution,” Israeli Affairs 6, no. 1 (1999): 55–56; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 115–16; Daigle, Limits of Détente, 285–86.

(p.204) (94.) Backchannel Message from the Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs (Ismail) to Secretary of State Kissinger, October 7, 1973 FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 347. Heikal contended that Sadat sent a message to Kissinger as early as October 5. I found no such message in the American documents I examined. See Colby et al., Israeli “Nuclear Alert,” 13n20.

(95.) Quoted in Gamasy, October War, 237–38. Ismail’s account of the message closely matches the American record. Gamasy would criticize the message for revealing Egypt’s “military intentions” (239–40).

(96.) Minutes of WSAG Meeting, October 7, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 355, emphasis in original.

(97.) Backchannel Message from Secretary of State Kissinger to the Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs (Ismail), undated [October 12, 1973], FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 447.

(98.) Kissinger to Ismail, October 9, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 407–8; Daigle, Limits of Détente, 298–300; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 155; Minutes of WSAG Meeting, October 7, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 357; Kissinger to Ismail, October 8, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 368–69.

(100.) On Sadat’s rejection of cease-fire proposals see discussion of Telegram 5360 of October 8, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 369, notes 3 and 4; Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 39–51, 81, 105; discussion of Kissinger and Zayyat’s conversation of October 7, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, 25, 348n4; and Telcon, Kissinger-Zayyat, October 6, 1973, DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, item KA11038.

(102.) Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 114. On the importance of continuing the fight to attain greater US involvement see Daigle, Limits of Détente, 300. On Egyptian opposition to the status quo ante see, for example, Telcon, Kissinger-Zayyat, October 6, 1973, DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, item KA11038, 1–2.

(103.) Pollack, Arabs at War, 111; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 146; and Evron, “Relevance and Irrelevance,” 161. On the general Egyptian elation at the outcome of the first days of fighting see Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 45; Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 156. For US views see Minutes of WSAG Meeting, October 7, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 355; Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, October 9, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 393.

(104.) Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, October 9, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, 25, 393.

(111.) Telegram from the Department of State Embassy in the United Arab Republic, February 28, 1966, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 18, 562–63, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-ments/frus1964-68v18/d277. See also Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture, 1960–1967,” Middle Eastern Studies 1, no. 1 (1996): 34–59.

(112.) Quoted in Maria Post Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 117.

(113.) T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 147–48, 260n17.

(114.) Pollack remarks in Parker, October War, 118. There is some evidence that after the war Sadat expressed the opinion that deep attacks into the Sinai raised the risks of nuclear strikes, (p.205) though he also understood Egypt could not reconquer the Sinai given the conventional balance. For instance, Colby et al. write that in 1977 Sadat told the Israeli defense minister Ezer Weizman that “he had never intended to penetrate deeper into the Sinai because ‘he knew what Israel had,’” presumably referring to Israel’s nuclear weapons capability. Colby et al., Israeli “Nuclear Alert,” 10–11. In a colorful anecdote, former Israeli president Shimon Peres told the Israeli media that former deputy prime minister Yigael Yadin “asked Sadat: Why, in the early days of the Yom Kippur War, didn’t you proceed toward the Sinai passes? Sadat’s answer, according to Peres, was: You have nuclear arms. Haven’t you heard?” Dan Sagir, “How the Fear of Israeli Nukes Helped Seal the Egypt Peace Deal,” Haaretz, November 26, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-how-fear-of-israeli-nukes-helped-seal-the-egypt-peace-deal-1.5626679.

(115.) Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford, October 29, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 20, 581, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d295.

(116.) Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt [NSC] to Kissinger, October 13, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 478.

(118.) Israel’s nuclear posture during this period may have encouraged such thinking; see Narang, Nuclear Strategy, esp. chaps. 7, 9–10, though I found no evidence Egyptian leaders discussed the nature of Israel’s force posture.

(119.) Dr. Murhaf Jouejati remarks in Parker, October War, 119.

(120.) Heikal, Road to Ramadan, 76. See also the April 1969 statement by Fawzi to Kissinger during the War of Attrition that “the UAR [United Arab Republic, i.e., Egypt] knows that the US would not sit back if the UAR committed aggression. ‘How could we attack Israel, knowing all this?’” In Meeting with Mahmoud Fawzi on April 10, 1969 [document dated May 29, 1969], DNSA, KT, item KT00023, 2. Though the focus was on attacks against Israel, it reflects the belief that the United States would become involved in any major conflict.

(123.) Hedrick Smith, “Soviets Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense,” New York Times, February 4, 1966, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/02/04/issue.html. See also Aronson with Brosh, Politics and Strategy, 99; Aronson, “The Nuclear Dimension of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 7, nos. 1–2 (1984): 112, 124.

(125.) Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 136, 251n191. For vague accounts that Soviet naval vessels had orders to use nuclear weapons in specific situations in defense of Syria or Egypt see Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007): 82, 140.

(126.) Minutes of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, November 27, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 993. For similar concerns during the Johnson administration that Israeli nuclear capabilities could provoke the introduction of Soviet nuclear capabilities and support to the area see Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, May 21, 1965, FRUS 1954–1968 vol. 18, 463–64, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/d218; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford, October 29, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 20, 581, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d295; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford, November 1, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 20, 586, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d299;Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford, November 2, 1968, 587, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d300.

(127.) There are reasons to question the seriousness of the Soviet intervention proposal; see Parker, October War, chap. 5.

(p.206) (128.) Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 17.

(129.) Rublee is addressing Egyptian nuclear forbearance, but the point is applicable in this instance as well. See Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 137.

(130.) Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9–46.

(131.) Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, February 28, 1966, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 18, 562–63, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-ments/frus1964-68v18/d277. Kissinger would later tell Hafiz Ismail, “We have urged them [the Israelis] to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on many occasions and officially.” Kissinger was no doubt aware, though, that privately the US had agreed to limit pressure on Israel, as well as of Nixon’s somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the NPT more broadly. For Kissinger’s statement see Memorandum of Conversation, May 20, 1973, KT00732, 19. On Nixon’s views toward the NPT and agreement with Israel see Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 116–18.

(133.) Avner Cohen, “Israel Crosses the Threshold Collection,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm. See also Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 117; Alan Dowty, “The Enigma of Opacity: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program as a Field of Study,” Israeli Studies Forum 20, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 9; Colby et al., Israeli “Nuclear Alert,” 45.

(135.) Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford, October 29, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 20, 581, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d295.

(136.) For the Soviet note see Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 24, 1973, National Security Archive, “The October War and US Policy,” http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm#doc71. On the US reaction to the (as the US record puts it) “real piss-swisher from Brezhnev” see Memorandum for the Record, October 24/25, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 737–42; Minutes of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, November 27, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, vol. 25, 990. Nixon raised a similar fear in 1970; see Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 134–35.

(138.) Quoted in Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 138. See also Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3 (May 2007): 409.

(141.) Bahgat, 410; Arms Control Association, “Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties,” August 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig.

4. China versus the United States

(1.) Throughout this chapter I use the terms “China,” “Chinese,” and “People’s Republic of China” interchangeably. I recognize that official US policy at the time recognized the regime under Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. I refer to Kuomintang (KMT), Nationalist Chinese, and Republic of China interchangeably.

(2.) For example, Shu Guang Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons,” in Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, ed. (p.207) John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 194–215.

(3.) See chapter 5 for additional discussion of the limits of the US nuclear arsenal during this period.

(4.) Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads, 1945–2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2009): 75; Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris, The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 44.

(6.) As David Rosenberg notes, “such transfers would continue throughout his administration … until by 1961 less than 10 percent of the stockpile remained in civilian control.” David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): 27–28.

(7.) Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 87–88.

(8.) PPS 39, To Review and Define United States Policy toward China, September 7, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 8, 147, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v08/d122. See also Paul C. Avey, “Confronting Soviet Power: U.S. Policy during the Early Cold War,” International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 184–86.

(9.) NSC 166/1, U.S. Policy toward Communist China, November 6, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, part 1, 289, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d149.

(10.) NIE 13–60, Communist China, December 6, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 739–40, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d362.

(11.) This stands in contrast to the Soviet case discussed in the next chapter.

(12.) Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Ryan Grauer and Michael Horowitz code two operations during the Korean War in which the United States and/or China participated. They code the United States as implementing the modern system at a high level during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign and a moderate level during the Punchbowl Battles. They code Chinese implementation of the modern system as high during the Punchbowl Battles. See Ryan Grauer and Michael C. Horowitz, “What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System,” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (January–March 2012): 83–112. Data and coding available in a Stata file at http://www.michaelchoroiwitz.com/data/.

(13.) Yu Bin, “What China Learned from Its ‘Forgotten War,’ in Korea,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 126; “Ciphered Telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin),” November 8, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110702.

(14.) “Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin to Stalin,” October 7, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Volkogonov Collections, Library of Congress, APRF, trans. for CWIHP by Vladislav Zubok, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117314.

(16.) Yu Bin, 124. A typical Chinese division was about half the size of an American division. Other estimates note a Chinese army composed of three to four divisions was roughly equivalent to one and a half to two US infantry divisions. Gordon L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950–1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 16–17, 174–76. The Chinese initially transferred three artillery divisions to the forces for Korea, which would increase to nine artillery divisions after January 1951 and ten by December 1952, along with some armor. Shu Guang Zhang, “Command, Control, and the PLA’s Offensive Campaigns in Korea, 1950–1951,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 120–22; and Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 105.

(p.208) (18.) Zhang, “Command, Control,” 112. See also Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in (p.217) the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 120–21.

(20.) Quoted in Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000): 92n.

(21.) Mao quoted in Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 120. On reform efforts and Soviet influence see Li, chap. 4.

(22.) Li, 129–31; He Di, “The Last Campaign to Unify China: The CCP’s Unrealized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949–1950,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 78; Alexander C. Huang, “The PLA Navy at War, 1949–1999: From Coastal Defense to Distant Operations,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 250–52.

(24.) Xiaoming Zhang, “Air Combat and the People’s Republic: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949–1969,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 270–88, 293–94.

(25.) NIE-2, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, November 8, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 7, 1103, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d789.

(26.) NSC 166/1, US Policy toward Communist China, November 6, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, part 1, 290, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d149.

(27.) NIE 13–57, Communist China through 1961, March 19, 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 3, 501, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v03/d244. See also NIE 13–58, Communist China, May 13, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 25, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d13.

(28.) Wang Jisi and Xu Hui, “Patterns of Sino-American Crises,” in Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. Michael D. Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng, and Danielle F. S. Cohen (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 139. See also Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), chap. 2; Michael D. Swaine, “Understanding the Historical Record,” in Swaine, Tuosheng, and Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises, 12.

(29.) Quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 68.

(30.) M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 220, see also 51–52.

(31.) Quoted in Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 83.

(32.) Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective,” in Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, ed. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 198.

(33.) Niu Jun, “Chinese Decision Making in Three Military Actions across the Taiwan Strait,” in Swaine, Tuosheng, and Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises, 296.

(34.) Quoted in Gong Li, “Tension across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Ross and Jiang, Re-examining the Cold War, 144.

(35.) Avey, “Confronting Soviet Power,” 184–86; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 20–21; Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106–9; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 12–13.

(37.) On the lack of progress see Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 26–42.

(p.209) (38.) Zhihua Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s, trans. Neil Silver (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 130–32; James I. Matray, “Korea’s War at 60: A Survey of the Literature,” Cold War History 11, no. 1 (2011): 108; Shen and Li, After Leaning to One Side, 57–63; Donggil Kim, “New Insights into Mao’s Initial Strategic Consideration towards the Korean War Intervention,” Cold War History 16, no. 3 (2016): 243–44; “Cable from Roshchin to Stalin, Relaying Mao’s Request for Clarification on North Korea Taking Action against South Korea,” May 13, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Russian Presidential Archives, Given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam in Moscow, June 1994, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115977.

(39.) Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, June 27, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d130; Melyvn P. Leffer, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 361–76; Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 319–20; Matray, “Korea’s War at 60,” 112; Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 136; and Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 142.

(42.) Donggil Kim asserts that Mao pushed for intervention on July 12, which, he argues, challenges claims that the US decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel led to Chinese intervention. His key source is a single meeting that day between Mao and Lee Sang-jo, an envoy for Kim Il Sung. At that meeting Mao argued it was likely the United States would send more troops, and “If North Korea asks, China is ready to send troops.” Neither Mao nor China appeared in a rush; Mao only asked for Kim’s response by August 10. Aside from preparing some troops, the most direct action China took appeared to be a crackdown beginning on July 23 against domestic opponents potentially emboldened by the American intervention. Donggil Kim, “New Insights,” 247–48, and “China’s Intervention in the Korean War Revisited,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 5 (2016): esp. 1005–6. See also “Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov,” July 22, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGASPI, trans. for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114904; “Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin),” July 13, 1950, History and Public Program Digital Archive, APRF, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110692; Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 138–42.

(45.) Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, ” 129–31; Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper no. 1 (June 1992), 28–29.

(46.) Zhihua Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese-Soviet-Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 2 (April 2010): 213.

(48.) Du Ping, “Political Mobilization and Control,” in Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, trans. and ed. Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millet, and Bin Yu (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 62.

(49.) Telegram to Stalin concerning the Decision to Send Troops into Korea for Combat, October 2, 1950, in Christensen, “Threats, Assurances,” 151. On the strategic logic as crucial see, for example, Walt, Revolution and War, 320; Chen, “Sino-Soviet Alliance,” 25–34; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 78–82; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86–93; Shen and Li, After Leaning to One Side, 48–49.

(p.210) (50.) “Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin),” October 13, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113743. See also Telegram to Zhou Enlai Concerning [Why] Our Troops Should Enter Korea, October 13, 1950, in Christensen, “Threats, Assurances,” 153.

(51.) Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 135. See also Zhou’s speech explaining the PRC decision to intervene, Speech, Zhou Enlai, at the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, October 24, 1950, in Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944–1950, ed. Shu Guang Zhang and Chen Jian (Chicago: Imprint, 1996), esp. 187.

(52.) Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949–1999,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 29.

(53.) Quoted in Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 85–86. See also Li, 92, and Peng Dehuai’s Speech at the Conference of Division-Level Commanders of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, October 16, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, esp. 176.

(55.) Quoted in Scobell, 86.

(56.) Smith to Truman, November 1, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 7, 1026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d731. See also NIE 2, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, November 8, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 7, 1101–6, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d789.

(59.) The U.S.-ROC treaty is widely identified as the motivation for Chinese hostilities. See, for example, Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 234–41; Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 191–94; Jun, “Chinese Decision Making,” 300–303; Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 136–41; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 81. Chang and Di downplay the significance of shelling but agree that it was orchestrated in response to deepening US-Taiwanese relations. Gordon H. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?,” American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (December 1993): 1507–8.

(60.) Quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 193. Emphasis in original.

(65.) Quoted in Michael M. Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split,” Modern China 34, no. 4 (2008): 485.

(66.) Quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 218. See also Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55 and 1958,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 152.

(71.) For a discussion and debate on this issue see Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 246–47.

(72.) For variations of this thesis see Christensen, Useful Adversaries, chap. 6; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chap. 7.

(p.211) (73.) “Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),” September 5, 1958, WCDA, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117013.

(82.) “Memoir by Wu Lengxi, ‘Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen,’” August 23, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, 7, see also 5–11, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117009. See also Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 249; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 192–202.

(87.) Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 13, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 168. For a slightly different translation with the same meaning see Telegram to Zhou Enlai Concerning [Why] Our Troops Should Enter Korea, October 13, 1950, in Christensen, “Threats, Assurances,” 153. The focus on ROK rather than US forces was consistent in mid- to late-October: see Telegram Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 14, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 170; Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, October 21, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 180; Telegram Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, October 23, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 183–84. Though Mao did note on October 14 that if small American units were “somehow cut off” the Chinese would fight them as well. See Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 14, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 171.

(92.) Quoted in Bin, “What China Learned,” 125. See also Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 86; and Rough Notes on NSC Senior Staff Meeting on Korea, August 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 7, 650, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d474.

(95.) Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” 222; Kathryn Weathersby, “Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 39 (July 2002), 17–19; and the documents in Kathryn Weathersby, “New Evidence on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995): 114–17.

(96.) Kim, “China’s Intervention,” 1011. On these points see also Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” 219–20, 222–27; Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 167–68; William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 105; and Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 55.

(97.) “Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov (Stalin),” October 3, 1950 [sent October 2], History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, trans. Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113732.For the text of the October 2 draft telegram not sent see Christensen, “Threats, Assurances,” 151–52. For a discussion of the two messages and Chinese hesitation see Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 149–58; Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 105–6; and Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 56, 89–90.

(99.) “Telegram from Matveev to USSR Council of Ministers,” October 7, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsAMO RF, trans. for NKIDP by James F. Person, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114922. Shen, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War, 175; Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” 223.

(100.) “Telegram from Shtykov to the Soviet Council of Ministers,” October 8, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsAMO RF, trans. for NKIDP by James F. Person, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114924; “Telegram from Matveev to Council of Ministers,” October 8, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsAMO RF, trans. for NKIDP by James F. Person, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114923; Telegram, Mao Zedong to Kim Il Sung, October 8, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 165–66; Alexandre Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16–October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (1996): 102.

(102.) Quoted in Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 166, also 161–67; and Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” 224; Kim, “China’s Intervention,” 1018–19; “Cable, Filippov [Stalin] and Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Ambassador, Pass Immediately to Cde. Mao Zedong,” October 11, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, trans. Gary Goldberg, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175798. For a contrary view see Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim,” 103.

(103.) Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Others, October 11, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 167.

(104.) Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Others, October 12, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 167–68, and Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Rao Shushi and Chen Yi, October 12, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 168. On the order of battle and components of the 13th Army Corps (Group) see Order, CCP Central Military Commission on the Formation of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, October 8, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 164–65. This reports the 13th Army Group composed of the 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd Armies and 1st, 2nd, and 8th Artillery Divisions. Zhang adds the 50th and 60th Armies to the 13th Army Group as well: see Zhang, “Command, Control,” 120. On the delay see Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” 226; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 58.

(106.) “Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin),” October 13, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113743.

(109.) Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 173–74. Kim cites Stalin’s October 14 commitment but argues this had little effect on China’s decision. See Kim, “China’s Intervention,” 1023.

(112.) Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua, October 30, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 199.

(114.) Quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 237–38. There is also evidence that the CPV headquarters feared US atomic attacks: see Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 308n70.

(115.) Quoted in John Lewis Wilson and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 15.

(116.) Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 171.

(p.213) (118.) Pape, Bombing to Win, 171–72. Mao would return to this option later as well; see Godwin, “Change and Continuity,” 34.

(131.) Quoted in Wang Jisis and Xu Hui, “Pattern of Sino-American Crises: A Chinese Perspective,” in Swaine, Tuosheng, and Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises, 136. See also Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers,” 492; Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 252; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 98; Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 185–86.

(132.) Du Ping, “Political Mobilization and Control,” in Li, Millet, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 63. See also Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 192. For a general overview at the time see Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 196–98.

(137.) Quoted in Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 172. Shu Guang Zhang and Chen Jian translate this passage slightly differently: “If the Soviet air force can, in addition to sending a volunteer air force to support our military operations in Korean in two to two-and-half months, dispatch air force to Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Qingdao, we then will not need to fear the [American] air attack.” See Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 169n.

(138.) “Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin to Stalin,” October 7, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Volkogonov Collections, Library of Congress, APRF, trans. for CWIHP by Vladislav Zubok, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117314.

(141.) On the change in Western capabilities and influence on US policy as a result see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 3.

(142.) Quoted in Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 199, also 199–211; M. Taylor Fravel and Even Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Posture,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 57–66.

(p.214) (145.) Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 192–94. They note that nuclear weapons may have had a deterrent effect in this crisis but highlight reasons for skepticism.

(148.) For instance, see his discussion of Mao’s eight points, the noose, and addresses in early September 1958 compared to other texts of Mao’s comments on those issues. “Memoir by Wu Lengxi”; “Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),” September 5, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 341–48, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117013; “Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),” September 8, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 348–52, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117015.

(150.) Quoted in Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 196. For additional statements see the quotations in Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 101; Gaddis, We Now Know, 249–51; Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and Real Tigers,’” 194–215.

(152.) Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb,” January 28, 1955, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 5 (New York: Pergamon, 1977), 152.

(155.) Quoted in Zhang, 198.

(160.) George H. Quester, “On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no. 2 (June 1966): 172–73.

(161.) Gaddis, We Now Know, 111. For additional discussion of Soviet efforts at disparaging the American atomic monopoly to forestall blackmail see chapter 5. This logic was not limited to the Communist dictators. For instance, George Kennan made a similar point when addressing American fears of Soviet conventional capabilities. Gaddis, We Now Know, 111.

(163.) “Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),” September 5, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 341–48, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117013.

(164.) The Second Speech, May 17, 1958, Speeches at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress (May 8–23, 1958), in Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought (1946–1968), part 1 (Arlington, VA: Joint Publications Research Service, 1974), 108. The text is also available at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_10.htm.

(165.) Talks with Directors of Various Cooperative Areas (November, December 1958), Speech of November 30, 1958, Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought, part 1, 136. The text is available at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_22.htm.

(167.) Mao is addressing paper tigers generally here, but the thinking is applicable to nuclear weapons, which he labeled a paper tiger. Talks with Directors of Various Cooperative Areas, (p.215) Speech of November 30, 1958, in Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought, 136. See also Mao Zedong, “All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers,” November 18, 1957, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 5:517–18.

(168.) “Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),” September 5, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy), 341–48.

(175.) Quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 217. Note also (at 221) the public comments by the chair of Sino-Soviet Friendship Organization, intended to reassure nervous Chinese.

(178.) Quoted in Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55 and 1958,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 157; and Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 149–53.

(179.) Matthew Kroenig, “Force of Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy,” Security Studies 23, no. 1 (2014): 19.

(183.) Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, October 2, 1959, CWIHP Bulletin 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 264–65.

(186.) Gaddis, We Now Know, 252. See also Goldstein, Deterrence in the 21st Century, 85–86; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 77–78; Li, “Tension across the Taiwan Strait, 160–61. For a contrary view largely based on Khrushchev’s memoirs see Mark A. Kramer, “The USSR Foreign Ministry’s Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959,” CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): 174.

(187.) Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, October 2, 1959, CWIHP Bulletin 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 264. The document is also available online: “Discussion between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong,” October 2, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, trans. Vladislav M. Zubok, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112088. Jonathan Haslam identifies this statement, with a slightly different translation, as occurring on August 3, 1958. He cites the August 3 conversation from the Volkogonov Papers. Those documents available in the CWIHP Bulletin 12/13 and the Wilson Center Digital Archive for the August 3 meeting, drawn from the same papers, make no mention of the issue. It is likely that Haslam is in fact referring to the October 2, 1959, document. Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 177. The text of the August 3 meeting in CWIHP Bulletin 12/13 is available on pp. 260–62 of that bulletin. The text of the meeting is available at “Fourth Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, Hall of Qinjendiang [Beijing],” August 3, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, trans. Vladislav M. Zubok, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112083.

(p.216) 5. The Soviet Union versus the United States

(1.) See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

(2.) David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): 14–15; Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945–1950 (New York: Garland, 1988), 12. The number of nuclear-capable aircraft increased over 1948, numbering an estimated 60 by December of that year and 250 by 1950. See Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 19.

(3.) Edward Kaplan, To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 31.

(4.) Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris, The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 91–97, quote at 92.

(6.) Quotes from Paul C. Avey, “Confronting Soviet Power: U.S. Policy during the Early Cold War,” International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 159–60.

(7.) Philip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, “The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945–1963,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 408, 411.

(8.) Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 251n50.

(9.) Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 55.

(10.) Hubert Zimmerman, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 4; Ross, American War Plans, 11–12; Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 419.

(11.) Precise estimates vary, but intelligence estimated 175 total divisions, and Karber and Combs note that 140 were stationed on Soviet soil in 1948, the bulk of the difference likely being deployed in Eastern Europe. In addition, they note that during this period there were 24–25 divisions in East Germany and Poland and 5–6 “located in the remainder of Eastern Europe.” See Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 408, 416–19. Holloway writes that in war plans in 1946 the Soviets had 17 ground-force divisions in Germany. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 232. See also Ross, American War Plans, esp. 86, 104.

(12.) For example, Grauer and Horowitz code the Soviet Union as failing or minimal implementation of the modern system during the Russo-Finnish War in 1939–1940. Soviet battlefield effectiveness subsequently improved, moving to moderate implementation of the modern system at the tactical and operational level during the winter counteroffensives of 1941–1942. Ryan Grauer and Michael C. Horowitz, “What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System,” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (January–March 2012): 83–112. On Soviet battlefield effectiveness during 1941 see also Jasen J. Castillo, Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), chap. 5.

(13.) Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 409. See also David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 231; Victor Gobarev, “Soviet Military Plans and Actions during the First Berlin Crisis, 1948–49,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10, no. 3 (September 1997): 11–13.

(17.) NSC 20/4, Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, November 23, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, 665, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d60.

(18.) Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 411, 414; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (1982; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 70; Report on Soviet Intentions Prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, April 1, 1948, Enclosure in Smith to Marshall, April 1, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, 552–53, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-ments/frus1948v01p2/d14; Ross, American War Plans, chaps. 2–4.

(19.) Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 411–13. For claims that US and NATO officials deliberately or inadvertently overestimated Soviet capabilities see Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982/1983): 110–38; and John S. Duffield, “The Soviet Military Threat to Western Europe: US Estimates in the 1950s and 1960s,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 2 (June 1992): 208–27.

(20.) Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

(22.) Early plans cautioned against fighting Soviet ground forces in Western Europe and focused on ground action in the Middle East and the southern Soviet Union, though by late 1948 operational plans began considering ground campaigns to liberate Western Europe. The discussion of war plans in this paragraph draws on Ross, American War Plans, chaps. 2–5; Kaplan, To Kill Nations, chap. 2; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 89–90; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 239–40.

(24.) Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 11–13; Ross, American War Plans, 13–14; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 91.

(25.) Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, undated [circa May 1948], FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, 571, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1948v01p2.

(26.) NSC 30, United States Policy on Atomic Warfare, September 10, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, 628: Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 13.

(27.) Quoted in FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, 625n1.

(28.) John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2nd ed. (2001; New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 254–56, 259–60.

(30.) NSC 20/4, FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, 665, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d60.

(31.) Marshall to US Embassy in London, February 20, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 72, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d45.

(32.) Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), esp. chaps. 3, 7.

(33.) Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 175, 297–99, 303–5.

(37.) Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 32, 53; Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, “The Soviet Union and the Italian Communist Party, 1944–8,” in The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1945–1953, ed. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 161–80.

(38.) Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 308–9; Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 81–82; Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 304–42.

(41.) Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26–27; Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 82; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 313; Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War, 96.

(p.218) (42.) Quoted in Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 183.

(43.) Roberts, 347–48. Stalin was very consistent regarding his fears of Germany and desire to keep it weak. See Roberts, 180–88, 236–40, 243–44, 277; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 30–31; Tripartite Dinner Meeting, November 28, 1943, FRUS Conferences on Cairo and Tehran, 510, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d362; Bohlen, Supplementary Memorandum, FRUS Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 513; Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, November 29, 1943, FRUS Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 532, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d363; Tripartite Dinner Meeting, November 29, 1943, FRUS Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 553–54, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d368; Tripartite Political Meeting, December 1, 1943, FRUS Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 602–4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d379.

(44.) Quoted in R. C. Raack, “Stalin Plans His Postwar Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 28, no. 1 (1993): 62.

(45.) On evolving Soviet policies see Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War, 111–17; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 54–55; Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 68–69; Mastny, Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 24–25; Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 64–72; and Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 350–59. Trachtenberg argues in A Constructed Peace that the Soviets were willing to live with a divided Germany provided the United States limit West German freedom of maneuver. But it was an open question if that would be the end result of US policy, and, as noted below, the Soviets also feared an American-led anti-Soviet bloc.

(46.) For Litvinov’s views see Geoffrey Roberts, “Litvinov’s Lost Peace,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4 no. 2 (Spring 2002): 23–54; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 229–30; Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 23, 72–73; Mastny, Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 18–19; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 52.

(48.) Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace; Joshua R. Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” International Security 40, no. 4 (Spring 2016): 7–44.

(49.) Report by the Policy Planning Staff, PPS/13, November 6, 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. 1, 774, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v01/d393.

(50.) On American policy as a response to Soviet power see Avey, “Confronting Soviet Power.”

(51.) On the general US effort see Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, chaps. 2–4; Michael Cresswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 13–21; James McCallister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), chap. 4; Melvyn P. Leffler, “The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan,” Diplomatic History 12, no. 3 (July 1988): 277–306.

(52.) Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 55–79; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 151–57, 198–203; Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 39–40, 64–65. An earlier communiqué on March 5 outlined the major initiatives, including “West German participation in the Marshall Plan, a federal form of government, and coordination of economic policies of the French zone with those of the [American and British] Bizone.” Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 43.

(54.) Quoted in Scott D. Parrish, “The Turn toward Confrontation: The Soviet Reaction to the Marshall Plan, 1947,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 9 (March 1994), 13–14. See also Novikov’s comments, 20–21, as well as his warning in September 1946 that American policy was moving in a direction in which the “preconditions would thereby be created for a revival of an imperialist Germany which the US is counting on using on its side in a future war. One cannot fail to see that such a policy has a clearly defined anti-Soviet focus and represents a serious danger to the cause of peace.” Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership, September 27, 1946, History and Public Policy (p.219) Program Digital Archive, AVP SSR, trans. for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808.

(59.) Murphy to Marshall, March 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 878, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d523. See also Chase to Marshall, April 29, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 900–902, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d540; Murphy to Marshall, May 29, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 905–6, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d545.

(60.) Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 106. See also Michail M. Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis, 1948–9,” in Gori and Pons, Soviet Union and Europe, 63–64; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 45.

(61.) Murphy to Marshall, April 13, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 892, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d533. For an overview of Soviet harassment policies prior to the June blockade see Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 43–57; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 119–32.

(62.) Quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, Alois Mertes Memorial Lecture, no. 6 (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute Occasional Paper no. 16, 1996): 53–54. See also Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 106–7.

(63.) Editorial Note, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 909–10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d548.

(65.) Murphy to Marshall, June 23, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 915, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d554.

(66.) Murphy to Marshall, July 4, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 949, https://history.state.gov/his-toricaldocuments/frus1948v02/d574. See also Marshall to Douglas, July 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 946–48, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d573; as well as Molotov’s comments in Smith to Marshall, July 31, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 998, https://his-tory.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d593; and the official Soviet response to the American protest of the blockade, Ambassador Panyushkin to Marshall, July 14, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 962, 964, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d579.

(67.) Smith to Marshall, August 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 1001, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d594. Stalin reiterated several times that the Soviets’ “only objection” was the formation of a West German government in the western occupation zones; see 1000–1005.

(68.) Smith to Marshall, August 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 1005; Marshall to Smith, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 1009, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d596. In two separate messages following the meeting, Smith noted that the Soviets were seeking agreement but remained firm on the German government issue. See Smith to Marshall, August 3, 1948, 1006–7, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d595, and Smith to Marshall, August 4, 1948, 1010–11, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d597, both FRUS 1948, vol. 2. Bohlen, Clay, Douglas, and Marshall all shared this basic assessment; see Memorandum by Bohlen, August 4, 1948, 1013–14, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d599; Clay to Bradley and Royall, August 4, 19481012, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d598; Marshall to Smith, August 4, 1948, 1015–16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d600; and the note on the Douglas Telegram, 1013n4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d598, all FRUS 1948, vol. 2.

(p.220) (69.) Smith to Marshall, August 6, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 1018–21, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d602. Note too Smith’s notes on his August 9 meeting with Molotov in Smith to Marshall, August 9, 1948, 1024–27.

(74.) Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 51.

(75.) Zubok, Failed Empire, 75. George and Smoke make a similar point, writing that “from the Soviet standpoint the blockade was a controllable and reversible gambit. Soviet leaders … could at any time find a solution to the ‘technical difficulties’ and open up ground access to West Berlin. Nor need the Soviets persist in the blockade if the Western powers threatened to overreact to it in ways that raised the danger of war.” George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 118.

(77.) Gobarev, “Soviet Military Plans,” 10, see also 6–7; Vojtech Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 35 (March 2002), 13.

(78.) Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 413–16; Daniel W. Altman, “Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis,” PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2015, 126; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 218–19.

(85.) William Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948–49,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 4 (Fall 1997): 569–602; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 354–55.

(88.) Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 3–4; Leffler, Struggle for Germany, 54, 60. Prior to the blockade Soviet officials concluded that an airlift would be ineffective, and many held this view well into the crisis; see Narinskii, “Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” 64–65, 71–72.

(89.) Smith to Marshall, August 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 2, 1006, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d595.

(90.) See Editorial Note, FRUS 1949, vol. 3, 750–51, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v03/d377.

(91.) Communiqué of the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 3, 1064, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v03/d522.See also United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Part of the 20th (5th Restricted) Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, June 14, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 3, esp. 1004–6, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v03/d498.

(93.) Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of Atomic Monopoly (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 54–60; Vadislav M. Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” in Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, ed. John Lewis Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 51.

(101.) Quoted in Holloway, 237.

(102.) Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 5.

(103.) Quoted in Garthoff, 6.

(104.) “Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership,” September 27, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP SSSR, trans. for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808. On Stalin and Molotov’s influence see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 169; John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 29–30.

(106.) The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State, June 9, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 4, 887, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v04/d594.

(108.) There is little evidence that the Soviet Union—or the Americans, for that matter—took the B-29 deployment as a serious nuclear threat. For a recent discussion see Daniel Altman, “Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force,” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (January–March 2018).

(110.) Quoted in Holloway, 231.

(114.) Quoted in Holloway, 265.

(117.) A third group was already present in Europe, with a squadron in Germany for training. President Truman approved the dispatch to Great Britain on June 28. Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 25; Altman, “Advancing without Attacking,” 85–86.

(122.) Quoted in Gaddis, 96. For a slightly different translation see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 164. In the West, Gar Alperovitz would popularize the thesis that the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan to intimidate the Soviet Union, though it is unlikely this was a major component in American decision making. For a discussion see Wilson D. Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

(124.) Quoted in Gaddis, We Now Know, 95. See also David G. Coleman and Joseph M. Siracusa, Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy (New York: Praeger, 2006), 9–10. On the general logic of such an approach see George H. Quester, “On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no. 2 (June 1966).

(126.) Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn, 59–60, see also 54–60; Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” 51; T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 93–94; Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 19–20.

(127.) For example, Gaddis, We Now Know, 92.

(130.) The US arsenal thus lacked most of the hallmarks of Vipin Narang’s “asymmetric escalation posture,” which he identifies as most likely to deter conventional attacks. Narang’s framework is meant to apply to regional nuclear arsenals, though at this point in history the US arsenal resembled such an arsenal. While the US nuclear arsenal failed to prevent the Soviet blockade, I argue that it influenced the shape of Soviet policies. Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), esp. 19–21.

Conclusion

(1.) See, respectively, Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmman, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

(2.) I estimated missing values for military expenditure or military personnel by taking the average of the year before and after the missing value. In cases where one of those was missing, I used the same value as the pre- or post-data that was available. In cases where no proximate years were available the value remains missing.

(3.) I take the data for both military spending and total troop levels from the National Material Capabilities version 5.0 dataset at the Correlates of War, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities.

(4.) Michael Beckley, “Economic Development and Military Effectiveness,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 1 (February 2010): 43–79.

(6.) On the changes in military production over time see Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). On force employment see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

(7.) Jan Teorell, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Felix Hartmann, and Richard Svensson, Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan15 (2015), University of Gothenburg: Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se; K. S. Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade and GDP Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (2002): 712–24. The Gleditsch data have more comprehensive coverage of countries after 1950 than do alternative datasets such as the Angus Maddison project. See Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version.

(8.) For a discussion see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001; New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), chap. 3.

(9.) On the declining importance of steel see, for example, Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 67.

(10.) Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 5–53.

(11.) I exclude cases where both sides had nuclear weapons, because the relevant comparison for nuclear monopoly is to dyads without nuclear weapons. That allows me to isolate the effect (p.223) of nuclear monopoly compared to how one might expect the dyad to behave if neither side had nuclear weapons. I take proliferation dates from Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 151–60. I include Israel in 1967 for coding consistency in this chapter. As discussed, excluding Israel would strengthen my argument. For a discussion of the 1967 war see appendix B.

(12.) Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816–2007 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 75.

(13.) I relax this requirement in appendix A. The results for median capability ratios are largely unchanged.

(14.) COW reports that Saudi Arabia entered the war on October 14 after the Syrian front had stabilized. Iraq and Jordan entered the war on October 12 and 16, respectively. All three exited the war on October 19. The main part of the war involving Egypt and Syria versus Israel began on October 6, with an end date of October 24 for Egypt and October 22 for Syria.

(15.) See appendix A.

(16.) Quote from http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs. As in the introduction, I exclude ongoing disputes, disputes during wars, and disputes between two nonnuclear weapon states that also involve a nuclear state (e.g., Cuba versus US in the Cuban Missile Crisis). Appendix A shows the results are robust to alternative coding. Glenn Palmer, Vito D’Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane, “The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 2 (2015): 222–42; and Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron Shreve, “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 3 (2019):811–35.

(17.) John J. Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,” International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989): 54–89. For extensions see Michael C. Desch, When the Third World Matters: Latin America and the United States Grand Strategy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 198n98; and Sebastian Rosato, Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 26–27, 231–40.

(18.) The percentage of unbalanced wars between nonnuclear weapon states is 1.2 times greater than the percentage of balanced wars (10.8 percent / 9 percent). In nuclear monopoly, the percentage of wars with the NWS having a large advantage is 1.14 times greater than when it does not (4.7 percent to 4.1 percent).

(19.) I am deliberately selecting on the dependent variable in this section. I do not consider political disputes in nuclear monopoly that did not escalate to war, nor do I compare wars in nuclear monopoly to wars involving only nonnuclear weapon states. This limits the inferences I am able to draw. I seek only to establish that in those wars that we do observe there is limited danger to the nuclear weapon state. At the same time, we know that there are wars of conquest between states that do not possess nuclear weapons, which can provide a useful background condition with which to view these results. On this point see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 46–47, 58–61.

(20.) See appendix B for a discussion of Egyptian planning regarding Israel’s Dimona reactor in 1967.

(21.) Various British governments had considered ceding control of the islands, and they were not considered part of the core British homeland. See appendix B.

(22.) Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, introduction to Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, ed. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 5; Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 5–7; Gregory D. Koblentz, “Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report no. 71 (November 2014), esp. 3–5; Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2012), 1–11, 106–26; Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).

(23.) Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). Bracken highlights that the “second nuclear age” was (p.224) developing during the Cold War and the two eras overlapped, but concludes that “1998 was the turning point. The events in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea were impossible to ignore and crystallized a new way of seeing the world.” Bracken, Second Nuclear Age, 95–106, quote at 105–6.

(24.) See, for example, Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era; Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” International Organization 68, no. 4 (Fall 2014): 913–44; Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9–46; Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambition,” International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 91–129; Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark, “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-Focused Theory of Counter-Proliferation,” Security Studies 26, no. 4 (2017): 545–74; Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

(25.) For a review see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Limits of the Nuclear Revolution,” unpublished manuscript, chap. 3.

(26.) Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 734; Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 9.

(27.) I do this as well when I focus on whether or not war occurred.

(29.) Michael Oren, “Iran’s Nuclear Designs Are the Greater Middle East Threat,” Washington Post, May 24, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/irans-nuclear-designs-are-the-greater-middle-east-threat/2013/05/24/8fe22228-c490-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7.

(30.) Chris Hedges, “Iran May Be Able to Build an Atomic Bomb in 5 Years, U.S. and Israeli Officials Fear,” New York Times, January 5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/05/world/iran-may-be-able-build-atomic-bomb-5-years-us-israeli-officials-fear.html?pagewanted=all.

(32.) The nuclear armed state may try to leverage its arsenal in this way, but it will likely have limited success.

(33.) That may also explain why they ignored American warnings regarding Kuwaiti oil wells.

(34.) Thomas M. Nichols, No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), chap. 1; Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, chap. 2; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (1982; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. chaps. 5–8; David G. Coleman and Joseph M. Siracusa, Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 55–57.

(35.) Rupal N. Mehta and Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark, “The Benefits and Burdens of Nuclear Latency,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 3 (September 2017): 517–28.

Appendix A

(1.) All data and replication commands are available at www.paulavey.com.

(2.) The following dyads remained in these wars: North Korea versus South Korea 1950; China versus South Korea 1950; North Vietnam versus South Vietnam 1965. The updated May 2018 Correlates of War MID and War coding identifies a militarized dispute but not an interstate war between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990. The alternative Reiter, Stam, Horowitz war dataset also does not code the 1990 Iraqi invasion, but does code those two states at war in 1991. I include that dyad as a result.

(3.) Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam, and Michael C. Horowitz, “A Revised Look at Interstate Wars, 1816–2007,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 5 (2016): 956–76.

(p.225) (4.) Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron Shreve, “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 3 (2019): 822–23.

Appendix B

(1.) Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 294–97.

(2.) Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), 62–65; Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 225–26.

(3.) Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 101–2, 114–15; Judt, Postwar, 296–97.

(4.) The discussion in this paragraph and the next draws from Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 27–47.

(8.) Pollack, 39. Egyptian losses against the British-French-Israeli forces are estimated at one thousand killed, four thousand wounded, and six thousand captured. The Correlates of War (May 2018) estimate twenty-two British battlefield deaths. See conclusion chapter.

(9.) This paragraph draws on Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 168–73; Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 115–19; and Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod, eds., Encyclopedia of Wars, vol. 2 (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 580–81.

(11.) This reversed an October 30 decision not to intervene. See Zubok, Failed Empire, 115–17.

(12.) On concern with the United States see Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 171; Zubok, Failed Empire, 117.

(13.) Phillips and Axelrod, Encyclopedia of Wars, 2:581; Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, Resort to War: 1816–2007 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 106–7.

(14.) Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1494–2007, 3rd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008), 576.

(15.) The 720 number matches the number of killed (669) and missing in action (51) provided by Clodfelter and Phillips and Axelrod. See Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, 105; Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 577; and Phillips and Axelrod, Encyclopedia of Wars, 2:580.

(16.) Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War (New York: Random House, 2013), 3–4.

(17.) Logevall, chaps. 5–21; and John M. Schuessler, Deceit on the Road to War: Presidents, Politics, and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 60–63.

(20.) On Vietnamese victories over South Vietnamese forces see Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), chap. 3. For discussions of US engagements see Jasen Castillo, Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 187, 194–202, 207–9; Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 716–38.

(21.) Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 6.

(23.) Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 761–62. Using different start and end dates, Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, 111, report 58,153 US battlefield deaths.

(p.226) (24.) Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 232; Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 283.

(27.) Including the case in fact biases the results against my argument, because aggregate capability indicators discussed in the conclusion chapter code Israel’s Arab opponents as having significant capabilities relative to Israel.

(29.) Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 80–81; Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 143–44; Roland Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly into the Six Day War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 62, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 285.

(30.) Avner Cohen, “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War,” Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 191 203–6; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 285–86.

(31.) Pollack, Arabs at War, 58–62. For general reviews that Nasser did not seek to provoke war but took a series of escalatory steps see Ben D. Mor, “Nasser’s Decision-Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-Choice Explanation,” Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (November 1991): 359–75; Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly,” 293–98; Cohen, “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War,” 200; and Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 43, 49, 89–96.

(32.) George W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000), 12–13; Pollack, Arabs at War, 58; Risa Brooks, “An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt’s Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 412, 416.

(33.) Quoted in Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly,” 304. The full conversation is available at Memorandum of Conversation, May 26, 1967, FRUS 19641968, vol. 19, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d77.

(34.) On these points see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 263–65; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 96–98; Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, 5–6; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 285.

(35.) Thant-Nasser UN Memcom, May 24, 1967, in Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 231. See also Anderson to Rusk and Johnson, June 2, 1967, at 236.

(43.) For the argument that Israel was aware of its conventional superiority and the crisis created an opportunity for Israel to eliminate potential threats see Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly,” 299–308; and Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 150–53.

(49.) M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008): 63; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 120–25, 135–37; Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 251–53; Henry J. Kenny, Shadow of the Dragon: Vietnam’s (p.227) Continuing Struggle with China and Its Implications for US Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), 53, 98–100.

(50.) Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 94, 99, 108–9; Li, History of the Chinese Army, 254.

(51.) Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod, eds., Encyclopedia of Wars, vol. 3 (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 1061; Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 255; Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 100–101.

(52.) Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 113n132. Phillips and Axelrod report that Vietnamese forces staged a “counteroffensive into Chinese territory” to which “Chinese defensive forces responded quickly and drove this incursion back, but there was widespread shock over the temerity of the invasion.” Phillips and Axelrod, Encyclopedia of Wars, 3:1061. It is unclear if Phillips and Axelrod are referring to the 3rd Battalion, 460th Regiment, attack. In any event, Vietnam does not appear to have “invaded” China but rather conducted a limited assault directly across the border with a small force on one occasion to disrupt the Chinese advance.

(58.) As Zhang notes, Beijing “granted operational autonomy to regional commanders but kept the duration and space of the fight under the command of the central leadership in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping was determined to avoid having the invasion turn into a quagmire for China.” Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 71. See also Scobell’s account, which highlights concerns that a larger war could lead to escalation with the Soviet Union as well. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, esp. 125–29.

(61.) Quoted in Zhang, 112. Xu primarily commanded forces in the eastern part of the fighting next to Guangxi; Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 132, 127.

(62.) Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War. The May 2018 COW dataset reverses the figures to report eight thousand Chinese and thirteen thousand Vietnamese battlefield deaths. This change would strengthen my argument.

(69.) Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, 141–42. The May 2018 COW dataset has the same start and end dates but reports twenty-two hundred Chinese battlefield deaths with one thousand for Vietnam.

(71.) The Correlates of War lists 255 British battlefield deaths, with nearly three times as many Argentine battlefield deaths at 746.

(72.) T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 147; Richard C. Thornton, The Falklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentina’s Bomb (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998), 11.

(73.) Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 449, see also 441; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 159–65.

(74.) The case is sometimes cited as evidence that the nuclear nonuse norm is sufficient to explain nonnuclear weapon state belligerency or that nuclear weapons cast little to no shadow (p.228) in international politics. For example, see Robert Farley, “The Long Shadow of the Falklands War,” National Interest, September 8, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-long-shadow-the-falklands-war-11224?page=show; T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), chap. 7; Ward Wilson, “Doubts about Nuclear Deterrence, Part III: Yom Kippur and Falkland Islands,” Arms Control Wonk, February 6, 2013, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/206263/ward-wilson-wednesdays-part-3/.My argument, by contrast, is that this is a case where one expects a limited nuclear shadow because of the conventional imbalance and conduct of the war but that one should not generalize beyond similar cases. The benefits of nuclear use for the NWS being low, the NNWS will have greater confidence that any costs associated with nuclear use will be sufficient to constrain the opponent. In other words, a limited nuclear shadow here does not imply a limited nuclear shadow when the NNWS is more conventionally capable or creates larger dangers to the NWS.

(75.) Oakes, “Diversionary War,” 456. See also Thornton, Falklands Sting, 106, 113; and Ruben O. Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas (New York: Praeger, 1989), 2–3.

(80.) Thornton, Falklands Sting, 105–6; D. George Boyce, The Falklands War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 35.

(84.) Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, eds., Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 138; Thornton, Falklands Sting, 69; Boyce, Falklands War, 39–40.

(87.) Memorandum for Mr. William P. Clark, National Security Council Meeting Agenda Item—the Falkland Islands Dispute, April 28, 1982, in Jason Saltoun-Ebin and Andrea Chiampan, “The Reagan Files: The Falklands Crisis,” August 5, 2011, http://www.thereaganfiles.com/820428-state-paper-for-nsc.pdf. Note too Secretary Haig’s comments at the subsequent NSC meeting on April 30: “unless Argentina softens on sovereignty, the British will go ahead and do some damage.” Earlier that month, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had highlighted British superiority in naval capabilities but, owing to geographic proximity, Argentine advantages in air capabilities. The Joint Chiefs noted that should Britain dispatch additional nuclear attack submarines it could seek to “engage the Argentine Navy to gain control of the seas off the Argentine coast.” Haig comment: Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, April 30, 1982, FRUS 1981–1988, vol. 13, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d195; Joint Chiefs comment: Background paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, circa April 15, 1982, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB374/.

(88.) Thornton, Falklands Sting, 184–85. A third Mirage was lost to friendly fire as it returned to base.

(90.) The official British history reports 321 Argentine deaths. Writing from an Argentine perspective, Ruben Moro lists “368 seamen who went down with the General Belgrano. ” See Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. 2, War and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2005), 293; Moro, History of the South Atlantic Conflict, 141.

(91.) William J. Ruhe, “Submarine Lessons,” in Watson and Dunn, Military Lessons, 9; Norman Friedman, “Surface Combatant Lessons,” in Watson and Dunn, Military Lessons, 21–24.

(92.) The Sheffield would sink on May 10 while being towed outside the combat zone. Boyce, Falklands War, 110; Thornton, Falklands Sting, 207–8.

(p.229) (93.) Dates reflect the day of the main strikes, not necessarily the day the vessel sank. All dates taken from Lawrence S. Germain, appendix, in Watson and Dunn, Military Lessons, 150–67.

(96.) Quoted in Thornton, 233.

(97.) Germain, appendix, in Watson and Dunn, Military Lessons, 166–67. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that Argentina had 240 air force and naval combat aircraft in 1982 and only 125 in 1983. See IISS, The Military Balance (London, 1982), 92–93; IISS, Military Balance (London, 1983), 99–100.

(98.) Germain, appendix, in Watson and Dunn, Military Lessons, 166. The British lost additional aircraft to accidents.

(107.) On the INF debate and renewed antinuclear movements see, for example, Leopoldo Nuti, Frederic Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother, eds., The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2015).

(109.) Minutes of Meeting Held at 10 Downing Street, Defense and Oversea Policy Committee, April 16, 1982, United Kingdom National Archives, CAB 148/211, 33. This meeting is discussed in Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 168. Despite Thatcher’s statement, there is evidence that the British government did explore possible action against the mainland; see Hannah Kuchler, “Britain Considered Bombing Argentina,” Financial Times, December 27, 2012, https://www.ft.com/content/fdd00d54-4dcb-11e2-a0fc-00144feab49a.

(110.) Thornton, Falklands Sting, 20, also 81–82, 90, 229.

(111.) Philip Bleek codes Argentina as exploring a nuclear device from 1978 to 1990: “political authorization to explore (but not pursue) a nuclear weapons option or formal linking of atomic research to defense agencies … [or] engaged in proliferation-relevant activity but not with sufficient intensity to merit coding pursuit.” See Philip C. Bleek, “Why Do States Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory, vol. 1, ed. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 168–69. On the Argentine nuclear program and role of Brazil see T. V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2000), esp. 104–5.

(112.) Warning Meeting—Nuclear Proliferation, Central Intelligence Agency, April 27, 1982, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040028-4.pdf.

(113.) Argentina’s Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falklands Defeat, SNIE 91-2-82, September 8, 1982, Central Intelligence Agency, Digital National Security Archive, U.S. Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: From World War II to Iraq, item no. WM00268.

(114.) Julio C. Carasales, “The So-Called Proliferator That Wasn’t: The Story of Argentina’s Nuclear Policy,” Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 62. See also Paul, Power versus Prudence, 105.

(p.230) (117.) Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 176.

(120.) The May 2018 Correlates of War data report the start date of the Israeli-Syrian portion of the war as June 6, 1982, and the termination as June 10, 1982. Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, date the conflict as April 21 to September 15, 1982. On May 2000 see Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 171.

(121.) On the internal Israeli political dynamics see Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 174–206, and Pollack, Arabs at War, 524–29.

(122.) Pollack, Arabs at War, 531, also 529–31.

(124.) Syrian combat forces continued to operate in Lebanon until 1990, mostly against Lebanese militias but also occasionally against Israeli forces. See Pollack, Arabs at War, 548.

(125.) Pollack, 540. Clodfelter reports Syrian losses from June 6 to September 3 as 1,350 killed, 4,800 wounded, and 450 tanks. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 630.

(126.) Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 603; Peter Polack, The Last Hot Battle of the Cold War: South Africa vs. Cuba in the Angolan Civil War (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2013), 17.

(127.) Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 60.

(128.) Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (London: Frank Cass, 2005): 202–3, 243–46, 249, 254–55; Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 604; Polack, Last Hot Battle, 184. COW May 2018 Directed Dyad List of Wars.

(132.) George A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 360. See also the accounts in George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 202–10; Stephen L. Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 86–89; and Polack, Last Hot Battle.

(139.) Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today 26, no. 10 (December 1995 / January 1996): 5.

(141.) Liberman, 57–58. Most sources date the test in 1987, although it is unclear if this was prior to the August South African decision to launch Operation Moduler in response to the Angolan offensive. Other sources date the activity to June–October 1988 or 1986. See Liberman, 58n43; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 213; David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 45; Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 6.

(145.) Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 115.

(148.) Andrew L. Stigler, “A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 124–57; Daniel R. Lake, “The Limits (p.231) of Coercive Airpower: NATO’s ‘Victory’ in Kosovo Revisited,” International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 83–112; Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 130–31.

(149.) Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War. Serbia reported 642 soldiers and 114 police killed from NATO action. See Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflict, 583.

(152.) Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, 155–56. Reiter, Stam, and Horowitz also code October 7 and December 22 as the start and end date for the international phase of the conflict. The May 2018 updated COW data alter the dates to September 15 and November 15, 2001. It is unclear why this change was made.

(153.) Stephen D. Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/6): 161–76.

(155.) Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 767. COW estimates four thousand Afghani battlefield deaths. (p.232)