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The Hypocritical HegemonHow the United States Shapes Global Rules against Tax Evasion and Avoidance$

Lukas Hakelberg

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9781501748011

Published to Cornell Scholarship Online: September 2020

DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM Cornell University Press SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.cornell.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Cornell University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in Cornell for personal use. date: 19 September 2021

(p.185) Index

(p.185) Index

Source:
The Hypocritical Hegemon
Publisher:
Cornell University Press

Note: Page numbers in italic type indicate tables or figures.

ABA (American Bankers Association), 88, 101
adjustment costs:
government choices and, 41–42, 44, 47–48;
shifting of, 3–4, 11, 25, 36, 62–63, 132, 143, 144
AEI (automatic exchange of information):
adoption of, 93–100;
within EU, xi, 2–5, 34, 89–91, 93–97, 133–34;
FATCA as driver of, 23, 82, 93–100, 133–34;
US reciprocity, lack of, xiii, xv, 5–6, 18–19, 100–105, 131, 132–33, 143
Amazon, xv, 121, 128, 139, 153n17
Andersson, Per, 37
Antigua, 73
Apple, xv, 127–28, 139
apportionment. See unitary taxation
arm’s-length standard (ALS), 46, 53, 115–21, 124–25
asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma, 6–11
Austria:
ending of bank secrecy by, xi–xii, 2–5, 98–99, 103, 133–34;
EU level AEI and, 2–5, 34, 90, 93–97, 133–34;
foreign capital in, 3;
foreign portfolio investment, 29;
Model Tax Convention and, 86;
share of financial services pre-FATCA, 9
automatic exchange of information. See AEI
avoidance vs. evasion. See evasion vs. avoidance
Backus, Jenny, 67–68
Bahamas, 73, 99
Bakija, Jon, 69
banks. See financial sector
Basinger, Scott J., 37
Baucus, Max, 111
Belgium, 2, 9, 29, 94, 99
benefits principle, 106, 119, 137, 149n13
Bentsen, Lloyd, 50
BEPS (base erosion and profit-shifting)program, 106–30;
context to, 107–12;
corporate opposition to, 107, 113, 117–21, 129–30, 144–45;
country-by-country reporting and, 121–22, 126–27;
implementation of, 124–29;
Obama administration and, xiii–xv, 16–21, 41–42, 107, 113–15, 119–24, 129–30, 144–45;
original purpose of, 114–15;
PE definition and, 121–22, 125–26;
transfer pricing and, 115–21, 124–25
Beramendi, Pablo, 37
BIAC (Business Industry Advisory Council), 55, 56–57
bilateral agreements:
CbCR template and, 123;
diffusion of, 153n20;
EU most-favored-nation clause and, 96–97;
FATCA and, 20, 90–91, 99, 132–33;
on information exchange, 45, 74, 79, 132–33;
OECD soft law and, 124–27;
PE definition and, 17, 122, 125;
Swiss bank secrecy and, 90, 92–93;
US power and, 21, 35;
on US tax withholding, 62, 149n13
binding arbitration, 125
Birkenfeld, Bradley, 85
blacklisting:
by EU, 5, 23–24, 34, 132, 134, 135;
by G 20, 82, 90;
by Global Forum, 1;
by OECD:
FATCA/AEI, 82, 86, 90;
HTC, 54, 55, 64, 65, 73, 75;
by US, 14;
of US, 5, 24, 135
Branson, Mark, 85
Brazil, 28, 29
Brunetti Group, 93, 97–98
Buchanan, James, 72
budget deficits:
Bush (G.W.) admin and, 69, 71;
Clinton admin and, 50–51, 63;
as predictor of government preference, 147;
shifting of to foreign countries, 143
budget surpluses, 67
Bush, George H.W., regressive tax policies of, 50
Bush, George W., administration of:
HTC program and, 11–12, 13–14, 23, 66–67, 71–81;
regressive tax policies of, 23, 38, 67–71, 80, 83
Cadbury Schweppes ruling, 109, 113
campaign contributions, 39, 40
capital gains taxes, 69–70
capital mobility:
as assumption of model, 44;
as brake on tax cooperation, xii, 53;
asjustification for regressive taxation, xiv, 17, 36–37, 42;
removal of barriers to, 51, 53 (p.186)
Cayman Islands, 29, 98, 99
CCCTB (common consolidated corporate tax base), 109–10, 128, 132, 137, 138–41, 146
CFA (committee on fiscal affairs, OECD), 16–17, 56–58, 73, 80
CFC (controlled foreign company) rules:
CCCTB and, 138;
check-the-box regulations and, 58–61, 87, 108, 110–11;
IRS authority and, 35;
limitations of, 113–14;
Obama admin and, 16, 19–20
CFP (Center for Freedom and Prosperity), 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76
Chamber of Commerce, 69, 71, 72, 103
check-the-box regulations, 58–61, 87, 108, 110–11
Cheney, Dick, 70
child tax credit, 67, 84
China, 28, 29, 31, 126–27. See also Hong Kong
Citizens for Tax Justice, 67, 68
Clinton, Bill, administration of:
CFC rules and, 58–61, 64;
HTC program and, 52–53, 54, 55–58, 64–65;
progressive tax reforms of, 12–13, 50–51;
QI (qualified intermediary) program, 13, 20, 22–23, 51–52, 61–63, 147
Clinton, Hillary, 83
Club for Growth, 70
coercion, 6–18, 142–44;
BEPS and, 122, 129, 130;
definition, 48;
drivers of use of, 42–44;
FATCA and, 4, 7–11, 12, 18, 87–88, 90, 96, 105;
great power status and, 22;
HTC program and, 11–13, 52, 54–55, 65, 73–75;
Iran sanctions, 135–36. See also power; sanctions and penalties
common consolidated corporate tax base. See CCCTB
common reporting standard (CRS), 1–6, 34, 98
conservative politics, 36–38. See also Republicans (US)
constitutional reforms, xi, xii, 2
constructivist narratives, xii, 11–15
consumer market size, 27–28, 30–32, 31
contractualist narratives, xii, 6–11
controlled foreign company rules. See CFC rules
controlled transactions, 115–17, 118, 120, 130, 139
corporate taxation:
adjustment costs and, 47–48;
BEPS program, 16–21, 106–30;
Bush’s (G.W.) policies on, 12, 69–71;
Clinton’s policies on, 50–51;
country-by-country reporting (CbCR), 16, 17, 20, 106, 121–22, 123, 126–27, 153n23;
deferred tax payments, 60, 86, 87, 110–11, 113, 128–29, 150n2;
EU anti-avoidance proposals, 136–41;
foreign tax credit, 21, 86, 111;
HTC program and, 49, 54–58, 64–65;
individual taxation vs., xiv–xv, 17–18, 36–42, 61–63, 87–89, 104–5, 130, 144;
legitimization of avoidance of, 57–58, 71–73, 75, 119–21, 131–32;
Obama’s policies on, xiii–xv, 16–21, 131–32;
Trump’s policies on, xv, 18, 137, 141. See also CFC rules; multinational corporations
Council of the European Union, 146
“creative ambiguity,” 106–7
Credit Suisse, 3
cross-border deposits, 8–9
cross-border investments, 27–32, 53
cross-border transactions, 53
cross-crediting, 111
CRS (common reporting standard), 1–6, 34, 98
Culbertson, Robert, 59
customer due diligence (CDD) rules, 102
deferred tax payments, 60, 86, 87, 110–11, 113, 128–29, 150n2
deficit reduction, 50–51
DeLay, Tom, 70–71, 77
DeLong, Brad, 51
Democrats (US):
conditions for transformativechange by, 21, 48, 144–45;
global enforcement and, 21–22;
interest groups as brake on, xiv, 17–18, 144–45;
taxation principles and, xiv, 17–19, 36–38, 82–84, 144–45. See also Clinton admin.; Obama admin.
depreciation allowances, 69
digital services tax (DST), 132, 137
discursive power, 39–41, 144;
of corporations, 18, 41, 54, 71–72, 76, 110–11, 117–19, 123–24, 145
dividends:
profit-shifting and, 127, 128, 150n2;
reporting of, 136;
taxes on, 28, 38, 60, 62, 69–70, 149n13, 150n2
double taxation, 80, 114, 117, 140, 150n2
DST (digital services tax), 132, 137
earned income tax credit (EITC), 50, 84
ECJ (European Court of Justice), 109, 113
ECOFIN (European Council on Economic and Financial Affairs), 94–95, 97, 98
Edwards, John, 83
Eichengreen, Barry, 51
electoral systems, 37
emerging economies, 112, 114, 125
estate tax, 68 (p.187)
EU (European Union):
AEI agreement within, xi, 89–91, 93–97, 133–34;
FATCA’s legal impact on, 4–5, 83, 91, 95–97;
market size, 28–33, 28, 31;
potential measures by, 136–41;
regulatory capacity of, xv, 26, 33–36, 131–34;
fiscal sovereignty, 34–36, 143;
most-favored-nation clause, xii, 4–5, 83, 95–97, 105;
nondiscrimination principle, 26, 125–26;
PE definition and, 125–26;
unanimity requirement, 2–3, 5–6, 34, 53, 95, 109, 127, 141, 143, 146;
state aid investigations by, xv, 127–29, 139
European Commission, election of, 146
European Court of Justice (ECJ), 109, 113
evasion vs. avoidance:
definitions, 46;
FATCA and, 83, 87–89, 104–5;
HTC program and, 49, 55, 56–58, 66–67, 76–81;
power and, 39–41, 107–8;
US capabilities and, 130
exit taxation, 138
ex post adjustments, 118, 120–21
Fabius, Laurent, 75
FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act):
AEI, as driver of, 23, 82, 93–100, 133–34;
coercion and, 4, 7–11, 12, 18, 87–88, 90, 96, 105;
constructivist perspective on, 12;
corporate vs. individual scope of, 87–89, 144;
definition and provisions, xii, 4, 12, 83, 87, 96–97;
intergovernmental agreement, transition to, 89–93, 96–100;
legal impact on EU, 4–5, 83, 91, 95–97;
reciprocity, lack of, xiii, xv, 5–6, 17–20, 100–105, 132–33, 143–44;
sanction threat of, xii–xiii, 4, 83, 87–88, 90, 96, 142–43;
tax havens’ agreement to, 82;
tax havens’ share before, 8–11
FATF (Financial Action Task Force), 69, 77
Faymann, Werner, xi
Feldstein, Martin, 68
FFIs (foreign financial institutions). See financial sector: foreign
Fiat, 128, 139
financial crisis (2008), 19–20, 40, 82, 84–85, 147
financial sector:
bailouts of, 84–85;
foreign:
lobbying/pressure by, xii, 4, 89, 97–98, 99–100;
shifting of burdens onto, 11, 62–63;
state power against, 27–33, 105;
US, lobbying/pressure by:
advantage gained as tax haven, xiii, 5–6, 83, 102–3, 105, 131–32, 133, 143;
FATCA and, 23, 88, 100, 101–104;
HTC program and, 57;
power of, 40, 144
financial transparency, definition, 46
FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network), 102
fiscal sovereignty. See national sovereignty
Florida, 103–4
foreign direct investment (FDI), 30, 32, 35–36
foreign holdings of US securities, 8–9
foreign portfolio investment (FPI), 29, 30
foreign tax credit, 21, 86, 111
France, 74, 126, 127, 140
Frieden, Luc, 95–96
Friedman, Milton, 72
G7, 44, 52–53. See also HTC program
G20:
BEPS project and, 45, 106, 112, 114–15;
FATCA/AEI and, 92–93, 97–100;
Starbucks and, 110–11
Garrett, Geoffrey, 37
Geithner, Timothy, 16, 86–87, 110–11, 144–45
Germany:
capital flight from, 51;
CCCTB proposal and, 140, 141;
country-by-country reporting and, 122, 123, 126;
equalization tax proposal by, 127;
foreign capital in, 3;
OECD and, 112;
Rubik agreements and, 90–91, 92–93;
Starbucks tax avoidance and, 110, 129, 145;
US, support for/fear of, 24, 122, 123, 132, 135, 137–38, 145–46
Global Forum, 1, 79, 80, 135
Gore, Al, 67
great powers:
market size and, 26–33, 96, 104, 105;
sanctions and, 15, 22, 25–26;
strategic choices of, 42–44;
US as only, 22, 26
Green Books of Revenue Proposals, 54, 86, 100–101, 111
Grenada, 73
Guttentag, Joseph, 51–52, 57, 59
Hacker, Jacob S., 70, 151n3
Hallerberg, Mark, 37
Hammer, Richard, 56–57, 71, 73
harmonized interest barrier, 138
hegemony. See great powers; power
Hickman, Andrew, 121
Hong Kong, 29, 32, 99. See also China
HTC (harmful tax competition) project:
Bush (G.W.) admin and, 11–12, 13–14, 23, 66–67, 71–81;
context to, 44;
introduction and provisions of, 11, 53–55;
killing off of, 66–67;
mistakes of, 49, 56
HTVI (hard-to-value intangibles), 116–17, 118, 120, 124
Hubbard, Glenn, 75
Huizinga, Harry, 9–10
hybrid entities, 59–61, 111 (p.188)
income inequality, 38, 50, 83–84
individuals:
taxation of, compared to corporations, xiv–xv, 17–18, 36–37, 39–40, 130, 131–32;
FATCA and, 87–89, 104–5, 144;
QI program and, 61–63;
wealthy:
policies favoring, 67–68, 69–70;
power of, 38, 39, 70
information exchange. See transparency and information exchange
instrumental power, 39–41
intangible assets, 115–17. See also HTVI; intellectual property
intellectual property (IP), 32–33, 32, 107–8, 116–23, 141. See also royalty and license fee payments
interbank transactions (value), 28, 30
internet trading, 109–10, 121–22, 127, 132, 137
Iran sanctions, 135–36
Ireland:
CCTB proposal and, 141;
corporate profit-shifting and, 35–36, 108, 141;
EU state aid investigations and, 127–28, 139;
new PE definition and, 125;
royalties collected by, 32
IRS (Internal Revenue Service):
CFC rules and, 35, 59–61;
check-the-box regulations and, 58–60;
FATCA reporting obligations to, 4, 12, 20;
QI reporting obligations to, 13
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act (2002), 69
Johannesen, Niels, 10
Juncker, Jean-Claude, 94, 96
Kennedy administration, 60
Kintner test, 59
KPMG, 117–18
Kudrle, Robert T., 58
KYC (know-your-customer) procedures, 62–63, 94, 136
Laffer curve, 17, 37
Levin, Carl, 19, 84, 85, 111
Lew, Jack, 128
LGT (Liechtenstein Global Trust), 19, 84, 94
libertarian lobbyists, 11–12, 13–14, 23, 67–78, 146
license fee and royalty payments, 32–33, 32, 122–23, 128, 141, 149n13
Liechti, Martin, 85
Lindsey, Lawrence, 67
look-through approach, 94
losses, refunds on, 69
Luxembourg:
corporate profit-shifting and, 35–36, 141;
ending of bank secrecy by, xi, xii, 2–5, 11, 98–99, 133–34;
EU level AEI and, 2–5, 34, 90, 93–97, 133–34;
EU state aid investigations and, 127–28, 139;
foreign capital in, 3;
foreign portfolio investment, 29;
Model Tax Convention and, 80, 86;
new PE definition and, 125;
non-participation in HTC program, 78, 80;
royalties collected by, 32, 108;
share of financial services pre-FATCA, 9
Macron, Emmanuel, 140
market capitalization (value), 28
market size:
of EU, 28–33, 28, 31;
state power and, 26–33, 96, 104, 105;
MCAA (multilateral competent authority agreement), 98–99, 100, 132–33
McCain, John, 68
McConnell, Mitch, 71
McDonald, Michael, 121
McMahon, Emily, 90–91
MFE (minimally functional entity), 117
Mirabile, Germano, 96
Mitchell, Daniel, 71, 72, 73, 76
MLI (multilateral instruments), 122, 124–25, 126
Mnuchin, Stephen, 137
Model 1 IGA, 91–92, 100
Model Agreement on Information Exchange, 79–80, 150n4
Model Tax Convention, 80, 121–22, 124–27, 149n13, 150n2
money laundering, 52, 69, 77–78
Moscovici, Pierre, 127, 128, 139
most-favored-nation (MFN) clause, xii, 4–5, 83, 95–97, 105
multinational corporations (MNCs):
adjustment costs and, 47–48;
legitimization of tax avoidance of, 57–58, 71–73, 75, 119–21, 131–32;
lobbying/pressure by, 40–42;
on BEPS project, 107, 113, 117–121, 29–130, 144–45;
on CFC rules, 60–61, 110–11;
on check-the-box rules, 61, 87, 110–11;
on FATCA, 18, 23, 87, 88–89;
on HTC program, 11–12, 13–14, 54–58, 64–67, 71–78;
on QI, 22–23;
on tax cuts, 69–71;
discursive, 18, 41, 54, 71–72, 76, 110–11, 117–19, 123–24, 145;
individual power vs., xiv–xv, 17–18, 36–42, 61–63, 87–89, 104–5, 130, 144;
structural, 41, 145; (p.189)
profit shifting by, 15–21, 27;
BEPS project against, 106–30;
exploitation of EU mismatches, 128–29;
hybrid entities, 59–61, 111;
loss to US from, 149n9;
royalties and license fees, 32–33, 32, 107–8, 116–21, 141, 149n13;
tax havens’ aid with, 35–36, 53–54. See also corporate taxation
national sovereignty, xi–xii, 6, 11–12, 34–35, 54, 71–72, 105, 141
Naumann, Manfred, 123
Neal, Richard, 88, 111
Netherlands, 32, 35–36, 108, 127–28, 139, 141
NFTC (National Foreign Trade Council), 117, 118
Nicodème, Gaëtan, 9–10
normative constraints, 11–15, 54, 65, 105, 146–47
Norquist, Grover, 68, 70
Obama, Barack administration of:
anti-tax haven efforts of, 4–6, 85–89, 104–5, 110–11;
corporate tax avoidance policies of, xiii–xv, 16–21, 131–32;
reciprocity, refusal of, xiii, 5–6, 17–20, 100–105, 131–32, 143;
tax fairness and, 83–84, 87, 129. See also FATCA
OECD:
Clinton admin and, 52–55;
corporate sector, accommodation to, 56–58;
evolution in campaigns of, 44–45;
FATCA’s impact on AEI and, 97–100. See also BEPS; CRS; HTC
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1993), 50–51
O’Neill, Paul, 14, 72–73, 74, 76, 78–79, 151n6
Osborn, George, 110
Owens, Jeffrey, 57, 79
partnerships, 59–60
passive income, 60–61, 108, 109, 113, 128
PE (permanent establishment), 16, 17, 109–10, 121–22, 125–26, 149n13, 150n4, 153n23
Pierson, Paul, 70, 151n3
political campaign contributions, 39, 40
political orientation (US):
constructivist narrative and, 12–15;
impact on global enforcement, 21–22, 38;
interest groups as brake on, xiv, 17–18, 37–42, 47, 144–47, 151n3. See also specific party
“politics without conviction,” 75–80
power:
forms of, 39;
of individuals vs. corporations, xiv–xv, 17–18, 36–42, 61–63, 87–89, 104–5, 130, 144;
market size and, 26–33, 90, 96, 104, 105, 131–32, 142–43;
political barriers and business power, interactions between, 41–44;
regulatory capacity and, 26, 33–36, 90, 96, 104, 105;
progressive taxation:
Bush’s (G.W.) claims of, 67;
Democrat policies on, xiv, 12–13, 17, 37–38, 50–51, 83–84, 131, 144;
global tax policies as substitute for, 51–52, 63–64;
wealth shifting and, 17
Prosperity Institute, 76
PTRs (preferential tax regimes), 13–14, 53–54, 58, 64, 72–73, 80–81
public opinion:
on bank secrecy, 3–4;
on distribution of taxes, 38, 55–56, 84, 88–89, 145;
on tax avoidance and evasion, 84–85, 88–89, 110, 127, 128, 129
QI (qualified intermediary) program:
Bush (G.W.) and, 14, 75;
business opposition to, 22–23;
circumvention of, 20, 84–85;
introduction and provisions of, 13, 19–20, 22–23, 61–63;
Obama’s proposed extension of, 86, 87;
responsibility shifting via, 19–20, 62–63, 147
qualified majority voting (QMV), 146
R&D super-deductions, 139–40
Reagan, Ronald, regressive tax policies of, 38, 50
real economic activity, 114–15, 139. See also substantial economic activity criterion
regressive taxation:
barriers to, xiv, 22, 35, 36–38, 41–42, 145;
Bush’s (G.H.W.) policies, 50;
Bush’s (G.W.) policies, 23, 38, 67–71, 80, 83;
Clinton’s policies, perceptions of as, 51, 63–64;
government preferences and, 41–42, 44, 47;
political orientation and, 37–38;
Reagan’s policies, 38, 50;
Republican policies on overall, 37–38;
tax competition as justification for, 17, 42, 81, 144;
Trump’s policies, xv, 18, 137, 141
regulatory capacity:
definition, 33;
power and, 26, 33–36, 90, 96, 104, 105;
repatriation tax holiday, 113
Republicans (US):
global enforcement and, 21–22;
taxation principles and, 17, 36–38, 144, 151n3. See also Bush admin; Reagan admin; Trump admin (p.190)
revolving doors, 40
royalty and license fee payments, 32–33, 32, 107–8, 116–23, 128, 141, 149n13. See also intellectual property
Rubik concept, 90, 92–93, 95–96, 97–98
Rubin, Robert, 50, 51
Rueda, David, 37
Russia, 28, 31, 135–36
sanctions and penalties:
EU AEI and, 150n6;
FATCA and, xii–xiii, 4, 83, 87–88, 90, 96, 142–43;
great power status and, 15, 22, 25–26;
HTC campaign and, 12, 54, 58, 78–79, 81;
against Iran, 135–36;
QI extension and, 86, 87
Savings Directive, 94–95, 98, 134
Schaub, Max, 102–3
Schäuble, Wolfgang, 133
securities transactions (value), 28, 30
separate entity accounting, 106, 114, 119, 131, 138
shell companies, 136
Single European Act, 44, 53
Slemrod, Joel, 69
Snow, John, 80
source vs. residence taxation. See BEPS program
sovereignty. See national sovereignty
special measures (BEPS), 115, 116–19, 120
Special Sessions on Tax Competition, 53–54
Stack, Robert, 113, 119, 122, 123
Starbucks, 110, 128, 129, 139
Steinbrück, Peer, 94
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, 85, 86–87
Strache, Heinz-Christian, xi
structural constraints, 6–11
structural power, 39–41, 144, 145
subjective tax determinations, 117–19
substantial economic activity criterion, 27, 53, 55, 56, 57–58, 64, 72–73. See also real economic activity
Summers, Lawrence, 54, 58
super-deductions, 139–40
supply-side policies, 67–71. See also regressive taxation
SVTDG (Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group), 118
Switzerland:
ending of bank secrecy by, 2–5, 11, 13, 98–99;
FATCA and, 83, 89–90, 92–93, 97–98;
EU AEI opt-out, 94–95;
foreign capital in, 3;
foreign portfolio investment, 29;
Model Tax Convention and, 80, 86, 90;
non-participation in HTC program, 78, 80;
royalties collected by, 32;
share of financial services pre-FATCA, 9
Tanenbaum, Edward, 89
Task Force on Information Exchange and Financial Privacy, 76
tax avoidance vs. evasion. See evasion vs. avoidance
tax competition:
Bush (G.W.) admin’s support for, 14, 23, 74, 77, 81;
business support for, 56–57;
in EU, 35–36, 109;
as justification for regressive taxation, 17, 42, 81, 144;
between small and large countries, 7
tax evasion vs. avoidance. See evasion vs. avoidance
tax havens, definition, 53
Tax Justice Network (TJN), 122, 124, 146, 149n12
Tiberi, Patrick, 88
TIEA (Tax Information Exchange Agreements), 10, 44–45, 77
TRACE project, 89
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 124–27
transformative change, definition and proof of, 44, 46–48
transparency and information exchange, 73, 75–81, 95. See also AEI; FATCA; QI, HTC
Treasury Department (US):
data on foreign holdings of US securities, 8;
FATCA, powers of under, 33–34, 35, 36;
responsiveness to lobbyists, 23, 40–41
Trump, Donald, administration of:
bank secrecy policies of, xiii, 103;
Iran sanctions and, 135–36;
MLI, refusal to sign, 125, 134–35;
tax-haven conditions provided by, xv, 18, 137, 141
trusts, 102, 136, 154n5
UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland), 3, 19, 82–83, 84–86, 98
unanimity requirement, 2–3, 5–6, 34, 53, 95, 109, 127, 141, 143, 146
uncertainty, 117–19, 125, 128, 139
unilateral measures, 126–27
unitary taxation, 46–47, 109–10, 114–15, 138
United Kingdom:
BEPS and, 145;
diverted profits tax, 125, 127, 154n24;
HTC program and, 53, 74;
Rubik agreements and, 90–91;
Starbucks tax avoidance and, 110, 129, 145
United States:
coercion by, 6–18, 142–43;
FATCA, 4, 7–11, 12, 18, 87–88, 90, 96, 105;
HTC program, 11–13, 52, 54–55, 65, 73–75;
sanction threats, xii–xiii, 4, 25–26, 83, 87–88, 96, 135–36, 142–43 (p.191) ;
as impetus to EU, 129, 130, 135–36;
market size, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32–33, 90, 96, 104, 105, 131–32, 142–43;
regulatory capacity, 33–36, 90, 96, 104, 105, 131–32, 142–43;
reciprocity, refusal of, xiii, xv, 5–6, 17–20, 100–105, 131, 132–33;
rising role of as tax haven, xiii, 5–6, 83, 102–103, 105, 131–32, 133, 143. See also coercion; FATCA; specific administration or interest group
US Chamber of Commerce, 69, 71, 72, 103
USCIB (US Council for International Business), 56–57, 66–67, 71, 118
UT+FA (unitary taxation and formulary apportionment), 109–10, 114–15
Vestager, Margarete, 127–29, 139
Vincenz, Pierin, 97–98
voluntary compliance, as great power strategy, 42–44, 48
voter attitudes. See public opinion
Washington Post, 72
weakest-link problem, 6–11
Weil, Raoul, 85
West, Philip, 51–52, 58
Widmer-Schlumpf, Eveline, 93, 95–96, 97, 98. See also Brunetti Group
withholding taxes:
EU and, 94, 95, 125, 134, 153n21;
FATCA and, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 96, 98, 142–43, 150n5;
German, 51;
on interest and royalty payments, 153n21;
in Model Tax Treaty, 149n13;
QI program and, 13, 19–20, 61–63, 64, 84, 86;
regulatory capacity and, 35, 36
Zucman, Gabriel, 10