The Perverse Effect
The Perverse Effect
Prolonging Civil Wars
This chapter investigates civil war duration and shows how culpable leaders respond to incentives to fight until the bitter end. It provides quantitative analysis that demonstrates civil wars last longer when culpable leaders are in power during the accountability era. It reviews a case study of Muammar Gaddafi during the 2011 Libyan revolution, which illustrates how the justice cascade has altered the decision calculus of culpable leaders. The chapter describes Gaddafi, who was unlike his peers during the impunity era, as he worried enough about an international prosecution to spurn the exile option. It recounts Gaddafi's decision to risk it all on the battlefield, which prolonged the Libyan conflict.
Keywords: civil war, culpable leaders, Muammar Gaddafi, Libyan revolution, justice cascade, impunity era
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